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Abstract
We consider the problem faced by a service platform that needs to match supply with
demand, but also to learn attributes of new arrivals in order to match them better in the
future. We introduce a benchmark model with heterogeneous workers and jobs that arrive
over time. Job types are known to the platform, but worker types are unknown and must be
learned by observing match outcomes. Workers depart after performing a certain number
of jobs. The payoff from a match depends on the pair of types and the goal is to maximize
the steady-state rate of accumulation of payoff.
Our main contribution is a complete characterization of the structure of the optimal pol-
icy in the limit that each worker performs many jobs. The platform faces a trade-off for each
worker between myopically maximizing payoffs (exploitation) and learning the type of the
worker (exploration). This creates a multitude of multi-armed bandit problems, one for each
worker, coupled together by the constraint on availability of jobs of different types (capacity
constraints). We find that the platform should estimate a shadow price for each job type,
and use the payoffs adjusted by these prices, first, to determine its learning goals and then,
for each worker, (i) to balance learning with payoffs during the “exploration phase”, and (ii)
to myopically match after it has achieved its learning goals during the “exploitation phase."
Keywords: matching, learning, two-sided platform, multi-armed bandit, capacity con-
straints.
1 Introduction
This paper considers a central operational challenge faced by platforms that serve as matchmak-
ers between supply and demand. Such platforms face a fundamental exploration-exploitation
trade-off: on the one hand, efficient operation involves making matches that generate the most
value (“exploitation”); on the other hand, the platform must continuously learn about newly
arriving participants, so that they can be efficiently matched (“exploration”). In this paper, we
develop a structurally simple and nearly optimal approach to resolving this trade-off.
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In the model we consider, there are two groups of participants: workers and jobs. The
terminology is inspired by online labor markets (e.g., Upwork for remote work, Handy for house-
cleaning, Thumbtack and Taskrabbit for local tasks, etc.); however, our model can be viewed
as a stylized abstraction of many other matching platforms as well. Time is discrete, and new
workers and jobs arrive at the beginning of every time period. Workers depart after performing
a specified number of jobs. Each time a worker and job are matched, a (random) payoff is
generated and observed by the platform, where the payoff distribution depends on the worker
type and the job type. We assume a Bernoulli distribution for the payoffs.
As our emphasis is on the interaction between matching and learning, our model has several
features that focus our analysis in this paper. First, we assume that the platform centrally
controls matching: at the beginning of each time period, the platform matches each worker in
the system to an available job. Second, strategic considerations are not modeled; this remains an
interesting direction for future work. Finally, we focus on the goal of maximizing the steady-state
rate of payoff generation.1
We now describe the learning challenge faced by the platform. In most platforms, more is
known about one side of the platform than the other; accordingly, we assume job types are
known, while the type of a new worker is unknown. The platform learns about workers’ types
through the payoffs obtained when they are matched to jobs. However, because the supply of
jobs is limited, using jobs to learn can reduce immediate payoffs, as well as deplete the supply
of jobs available to the rest of the marketplace. Thus the presence of capacity constraints forces
us to carefully design both exploration and exploitation in the matching algorithm in order to
optimize the rate of payoff generation.
Our main contribution in this paper is the development of a matching policy that is nearly
payoff optimal. Our algorithm is divided into two phases in each worker’s lifetime: exploration
(identification of the worker type) and exploitation (optimal matching given the worker’s iden-
tified type). We refer to our policy as DEEM: Decentralized Explore-then-Exploit for Matching.
In the model we consider, workers and jobs arrive over discrete time. Workers live for N time
steps, while jobs each take one period for a single worker to complete. We assume the platform
has system-level knowledge of the arrival rates of workers and jobs, as well as the expected
payoff generated when workers of a given type are matched to jobs of a given type. However,
the platform is initially unaware of any specific worker’s type on arrival. Thus the platform
must ensure that workers’ types are learned well enough to generate high payoffs. This is the
challenge addressed by DEEM.
DEEM is an algorithm that assigns jobs to workers over time. We begin by noting that DEEM
has a natural decentralization property: it determines the choice of job type for a worker based
only on that worker’s history, and not based on any other workers’ histories. (We note, however,
that DEEM itself is designed with knowledge of the global system-level statistics described
1This is a reasonable proxy for the goal of a platform that, say, takes a fraction of the total surplus generated
through matches. More generally, we believe that this is a benchmark problem whose solution informs algorithmic
design for settings with other related objectives, such as revenue maximization.
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above). This decentralization is inspired by the fact that in large-scale online platforms, matching
is typically carried out on an individual basis. For example, if a worker searches for jobs on an
online labor market platform, the platform will generally display available jobs in a personalized
rank order based on metadata about that worker. (In practice, this decentralization arises in part
due to the inherent asynchronous nature of these platforms: workers and jobs arrive continuously
over time, and batched centralized matching may be infeasible as a product design.)
At a high level, DEEM operates as follows during the lifetime of a given worker. First,
DEEM explores to make a confident estimate of the type of this worker. This exploration phase
consists of two phases: a guessing phase, where DEEM initially samples job types uniformly at
random to develop a reasonable maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate of the worker’s type;
and a confirmation phase, when DEEM chooses jobs to confirm the MAP type as efficiently
as possible. The exploration phase is followed by an exploitation phase, during which jobs are
assigned based on the worker type that was confirmed during exploration. Each of these phases
is carefully designed to ensure that the rate of payoff generation is optimized while ensuring
capacity constraints are met.
To develop intuition for our solution, consider a simple example with two types of jobs (Easy
and Hard) and two types of workers (Expert and Novice). Experts can do both types of tasks
well; but novices can only do easy tasks well. Suppose that there is a limited supply of easy jobs:
more than the mass of novices available, but less than the total mass of novices and experts. In
particular, to maximize payoff the platform must learn enough to match some experts to hard
jobs.
DEEM has several key features, each of which can be understood in the context of this
example. First, because DEEM operates at the level of a given worker, we must ensure that the
algorithm nevertheless does not violate capacity constraints. In particular, it is essential for the
algorithm to account for the externality to the rest of the market when a worker is matched to
a given job. For example, if easy jobs are relatively scarce, then matching a worker to such a
job makes it unavailable to the rest of the market. Our approach is to “price” this externality:
we find shadow prices for the capacity constraints, and adjust all per-match payoffs downward
using these prices.
Second, our algorithm design specifies learning goals that ensure an efficient balance between
exploration and exploitation. In particular, in our example, we note that there are two kinds of
errors possible while exploring: misclassifying a novice as an expert, and vice versa. Occasionally
mislabeling experts as novices is not catastrophic: some experts need to do easy jobs anyway,
and so the algorithm can account for such errors in the exploitation phase. Thus, relatively less
effort can be invested in minimizing this error type. However, mistakenly labeling novices as
experts can be catastrophic: in this case, novices will be matched to hard jobs in the exploitation
phase, causing substantial loss of payoff; thus the probability of such errors must be kept very
small. A major contribution of our work is to precisely identify the correct learning goals that
determine progression of the algorithm from the exploration phase to the exploitation phase,
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and to then design DEEM to meet these learning goals while maximizing payoff generation.
Third, the exploitation phase in DEEM is carefully constructed to ensure that capacity con-
straints are met while maximizing payoffs. A naive approach during the exploitation phase
would match a worker to any job type that yields the maximum externality-adjusted payoff cor-
responding to his type label. It turns out that such an approach leads to significant violations of
capacity constraints, and hence poor performance. The reason is that in a generic capacitated
problem instance, one or more worker types are indifferent between multiple job types, and
suitable tie-breaking is necessary to achieve good performance. In our theoretical development,
we achieve this by modifying the solution to the static optimization problem with known worker
types, whereas our practical implementation of DEEM achieves appropriate tie-breaking via
simple but dynamically updated shadow prices.
Our main result (Theorem 1) shows that DEEM achieves essentially optimal regret as the
number of jobs N performed by each worker during their lifetime grows, where regret is the loss
in payoff accumulation rate relative to the maximum achievable with known worker types. In
our setting, a lower bound on the regret is (C logN/N)(1 + o(1)) for some C ∈ [0,∞) that is a
function of system parameters. DEEM achieves this level of regret to leading order when C > 0,
while it achieves a regret of O(log logN/N) if C = 0.
Situations where C > 0 are those in which there is an inherent tension between the goals
of learning and payoff maximization. To develop intuition, consider an expanded version of the
example above, where each worker can be either an expert or novice programmer, as well as an
expert or novice graphic designer. Suppose the supply of jobs is such that if worker types were
known, only expert graphic designers who are also novice programmers would be matched to
graphic design jobs.2 But if we are learning worker types, then expert graphic designers must
be matched to approximately O(logN) programming jobs to learn whether they are novice
or expert programmers – and in turn, whether they should be matched to graphic design or
programming jobs, respectively. Thus O(logN/N) average regret per period is incurred relative
to the optimal solution with known types. DEEM precisely minimizes the regret incurred while
these distinctions are made, thus achieving the lower bound on the regret.
Our theory is complemented by a practical heuristic that we call DEEM+, which optimizes
performance for small values of N , and an implementation and simulation that demonstrates a
natural way of translating our work into practice. In particular, our simulations reveal substan-
tial benefit from jointly managing capacity constraints and learning, as we do in DEEM and
DEEM+.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After discussing related work in Section
2, we present our model and outline the optimization problem of interest to the platform in
Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the three key ideas above in the design of DEEM, and
present its formal definition. In Section 5, we present our main theorem, and discuss the optimal
2This would be the case, e.g., if programming jobs are both in high demand and more valuable (conditional
on successful completion) than graphic design jobs.
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regret scaling. In Section 6 we present a sketch of the proof of the main result. In Section 7,
discuss practical implementation of DEEM and present the heuristic DEEM+ . In Section 8,
we use simulations to compare the performance of DEEM+ with benchmark multi-armed bandit
algorithms. We conclude in Section 9. All proofs are in the appendices.
2 Related literature
A foundational model for investigating the exploration-exploitation tradeoff is the stochastic
multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem [10, 19, 29]. The goal is to find an adaptive expected-
regret-minimizing policy for choosing among arms with unknown payoff distributions (where
regret is measured against the expected payoff of the best arm) [4, 11, 34]. The closest work in
this literature to our paper is by Agrawal et al. [1]; in their model, they assume the joint vector
of arm distributions can only take on one of finitely many values. This introduces correlation
across different arms; depending on certain identifiability conditions, the optimal regret is either
Θ(1/N) or Θ(logN/N). In our model, the analog is that job types are arms, and for each worker
we solve a MAB problem to identify the true type of a worker, from among a finite set of possible
worker types.
Our work is also related to recent literature on MAB problems with capacity constraints; we
refer to these broadly as bandits with knapsacks. The formulation is the same as the classical
MAB problem, with the modification that every pull of an arm depletes a vector of resources
which are limited in supply [15]. The formulation subsumes several related problems in revenue
management under demand uncertainty [12, 17, 18, 42, 47], and budgeted dynamic procurement
[14, 45]; there have been a variety of extensions [2, 16], with recently a significant generalization
of the problem to a contextual bandit setting, with concave rewards and convex constraints
[3, 6]. There is considerable difference between our model and bandits with knapsacks. Bandits
with knapsacks consider a single MAB problem over a fixed time horizon. Our setting on the
other hand can be seen as a system with an ongoing arriving stream of MAB problems, one
per worker; these MAB problems are coupled together by the capacity constraints on arriving
jobs. Indeed, as noted in the introduction, a significant structural point for us is to solve these
problems in a decentralized manner, to ease their implementation in large-scale online platforms.
Several MAB problems with matching constraints can be seen as instances of a larger class
of models typically referred to as combinatorial bandits [21, 27, 28, 33, 35, 42]. Considering
the problem of matching all the workers that exist on a platform to the set of available jobs
in a particular time period, one can think of the combinatorial set of all possible matchings to
be the arms in a MAB setting (sometimes called “superarms”); this formulation is the closest
to the one in [27]. Several works have looked at exploiting the structure of such problems in
various settings to yield efficient learning algorithms (cf. [27, 35, 42]). In our case, there are two
key aspects that make such a reduction to combinatorial bandits infeasible. (1) The number of
workers and jobs on real-world platforms is large; and hence the number of possible matchings
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is prohibitively large, even when one accounts for limited variety in job types (worker types are
unknown and there is a vast heterogeneity in worker histories). Thus decentralization is critical
to have a practically feasible solution, which is a feature rarely seen in combinatorial bandit
algorithms. (2) The fact that the workers are arriving and leaving asynchronously means that
the set of possible matchings, and hence the set of combinatorial arms, is changing over time,
which is another feature that is relatively uncommon in extant literature (an example is [20],
which considers this problem in a non-combinatorial setting).
We conclude by discussing some other directions of work that are related to this paper.
There are a number of recent pieces of work that consider efficient matching in dynamic two-
sided matching markets [7, 8, 13, 23, 24, 30–32]; a related class of dynamic resource allocation
problems, online bipartite matching, is also well studied in the computer science community (see
[39] for a survey). Similar to the current paper, Fershtman and Pavan [26] also study matching
with learning, mediated by a central platform. Relative to our model, their work does not
have constraints on the number of matches per agent, while it does consider agent incentives.
Finally, a recent work [38] studies a pure learning problem in a setting similar to ours with
capacity constraints on each type of server/expert; while there are some similarities in the style
of analysis, that paper focuses exclusively on learning the exact type, rather than balancing
exploration and exploitation as we do in this paper.
3 The model and the optimization problem
In this section we first describe our model. In particular, we describe the primitives of our
platform (“workers” and “jobs”), and give a formal specification of the matching process we
study. We conclude by precisely defining the optimization problem of interest that we solve in
this paper.
3.1 Preliminaries: A continuum model
In this section, we describe the basic model that we work with.
Time. We assume that time is discrete t = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
Workers and jobs. For convenience we adopt the terminology of workers and jobs to
describe the two sides of the market. Each job in the system is of one of a fixed set of job types
J , and each worker in the system is of one of a fixed set of worker types I.
Arrivals and departures: A continuum model. The model we consider is a continuum
model, and so the evolution of the system will be described by continuous masses of workers and
jobs.3 Workers and jobs themselves are infinitesimal. Informally, this approach is intended to
capture the dynamics of a large market, i.e., where many workers and jobs are present at each
time step.
3Formally, this can be seen as a continuum scaling of a discrete system; see, e.g., [22, 36, 37].
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In particular, at each time step, a mass ρˆi > 0 of workers of type i and a mass µj > 0 of jobs
of type j arrive. Each job lives for only a single time step. Each arriving worker lives in the
system for N time steps then leaves the system.4 We refer to N as the worker lifetime. During
each time step that a worker is present, she has the opportunity to be matched to a job in each
time step (so each job takes one unit of time to complete). We assume the platform knows N .
Note that as a result of the worker lifetime being N , we have ρi = ρˆiN as the total mass of
workers of type i in the system at each time step. For our theoretical analysis, we later consider
a scaling regime where N →∞, and ρˆi = ρˆi(N)→ 0, while ρi remains fixed, i.e., ρˆi(N) = ρi/N .
In this regime, worker lifetimes grow to infinity, and arrival rates scale down, but the total mass
of workers of each type present in each time period remains fixed. We suppress the dependence
of ρˆi on N throughout the paper for notational convenience.
In what follows, we model the scenario where type uncertainty exists only for workers; i.e.,
the platform knows the types of arriving jobs exactly, but will need to learn the types of arriving
workers. We also assume for now that the arrival rates of jobs and workers are known to the
platform, though it is possible to extend our model to consider a setting where these arrival
rates are unknown. Since the job types are known on arrival, the job arrival rates can be
directly estimated empirically. Estimating the arrival rates of the different worker types is less
straightforward since the types of the arriving workers are not known. In Remark 1 below, we
discuss how a platform can estimate these rates from the outcome data.
Matching and the payoff matrix. We imagine that if a worker of type i is matched to
a job of type j, then the resulting match generates a Bernoulli reward with success probability
A(i, j) ∈ [0, 1]. The payoff matrix A thus characterizes compatibility between workers and jobs.
We call the matrix A the payoff matrix. Throughout, we assume that no two rows of A are
identical.5
Since we are working in a large-system continuum model, we do not directly work with a
stochastic reward specification. Instead, we formally model this reward generation procedure
as follows. If at time t a mass mt(i, j) of workers of type i is matched to jobs of type j, then
we assume that a mass A(i, j)mt(i, j) of these matches generate a reward of 1 (per unit mass),
while a mass (1 − A(i, j))mt(i, j) generates a reward of zero (per unit mass). As we will only
be concerned with the long-run rate of payoff generation, we do not concern ourselves with the
division of this payoff between workers and employers.
We define an “empty” job type κ, such that all worker types matched to κ generate zero
reward, i.e., A(i, κ) = 0 for all i. We view κ as representing the possibility that a worker goes
unmatched, and thus assume that an unbounded capacity of job type κ is available, i.e., µκ =∞.
We assume that κ is included in J .
A key assumption in our work is that the platform knows the matrix A. In particular, we
4Our analysis and results generalize to random worker lifetimes that are i.i.d. across workers of different types,
with mean N and any distribution such that the lifetime exceeds N/polylog(N) with high probability.
5This mild requirement simply ensures that it is possible, in principle, to distinguish between each pair of
worker types.
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are considering a platform that has enough aggregate information to understand compatibility
between different worker and job types. However, for a new worker that arrives into the platform,
his type is not known. Thus, from the perspective of the platform, there will be uncertainty in
payoffs in each period because although the platform knows that a given mass of workers of type
i exist in the platform, the identity of the workers of type i is not known. In Remark 1 below,
we discuss how a platform may learn A from the payoff data generated in the early period of its
operation.
Generalized imbalance. Throughout our technical development, we make a mild structural
assumption on the problem instance, defined by the tuple (ρ, µ,A). This is captured by the
following definition. We say that arrival rates ρ = (ρi)i∈I and µ = (µj)j∈J satisfy the generalized
imbalance condition if there is no pair of nonempty subsets of worker types and job types (I ′,J ′),
such that the total worker arrival rate of I ′ exactly matches the total job arrival rate of J ′.
Formally, ∑
i∈I′
ρi 6=
∑
j∈J ′
µj ∀I ′ ⊆ I,J ′ ⊆ J , I ′ 6= φ . (1)
The generalized imbalance condition holds generically.6 Note that this condition does not depend
on the matrix A.
Remark 1 (Estimating A and ρˆ). Assuming N ≥ |J |, suppose that we have data on the
performance of several workers, with each worker performing one job of each type in J . The
problem of learning A and
(
ρˆi/
(∑
i′∈I ρˆi′
))
i∈I from this data is that of learning a mixture of
product Bernoulli distributions. [25] shows how to do this efficiently. These quantities can thus
be estimated accurately by the platform in the early stages of its inception. ρˆ can be estimated
from
(
ρˆi/
(∑
i′∈I ρˆi′
))
i∈I , by multiplying it with the total worker arrival rate.
3.2 Matching policies and system dynamics
Informally, we model the following process. The operator observes, at any point in time, the
distribution of histories of workers in the platform, and also knows the job arrival rates µj for
j ∈ J . The matching policy of the platform amounts to determining what mass of workers of
each type of history will be matched to which type of jobs. When these matches are executed,
the state of the system updates to a new distribution over workers’ histories.
With this intuition in mind, we now give a formal specification of our system dynamics.
Worker history. To define the state of the system and the resulting matching dynam-
ics, we need the notion of a worker history. A worker history of length k is a tuple Hk =
((j1, r1), . . . , (jk, rk)), where jk′ is the job type this worker was matched to at her k′-th time
step in the system, for 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k; and rk′ ∈ {0, 1} is the corresponding reward obtained. Note
6The set (ρˆ, µ) for which the condition holds is open and dense in R|I|+|J |++ , where R++ are the strictly positive
real numbers.
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that since workers live for N jobs, the histories will have lengths k = 0, . . . , N − 1. We use H
to denote a generic history. We let φ denote the empty history (for k = 0).
System profile. A system profile ν is a joint measure over worker histories and worker types;
i.e., ν(H, i) is the mass of workers in the system with history H and type i. The evolution of
the system is a discrete-time dynamical system ν0, ν1, ν2, . . ., where each νt is a system profile.
Note that the platform does not directly observe the system profile, but it can infer it from
observable information. In particular, for every history H, the platform observes the mass∑
i νt(H, i) of workers with history H. It can then infer the masses νt(H, i) individually by using
knowledge of the arrival rates ρˆi and the A matrix (which allows it to calculate the likelihood
of seeing the sequence of outcomes in H under the worker type i), together with Bayes’ rule.
Note that since there are only finitely many job types and workers live for a finite lifetime,
there are only finitely many worker histories possible. Thus, the system profile is a measure over
a finite support. Note that for each k = 0, . . . , N − 1, in any system profile νt, the mass of
workers of type i with histories of length k is exactly ρˆi (the mass of workers who arrived k time
steps ago).
Matching policy. To describe the dynamics we assume that the platform uses a matching
policy to match the entire mass of workers to jobs in each time step (we think of unmatched
workers as being matched to the empty job type κ). As noted above, we assume that any mass
of jobs left unmatched in a given period disappears at the end of that period; our results do not
depend on this assumption.
We suppose that the system starts at time t = 0 with no workers in the system before this
time.7 A matching policy pi0, pi1, . . . for the system specifies, at each time t, given a system profile
νt, the mass of workers with each history that is matched to jobs of each type. In particular, let
pit(H, j|νt) denote the fraction of workers with history H matched to jobs of type j at time t,
given a system profile νt. (Thus
∑
j pit(H, j|νt) = 1 for all t, H, and νt.) Note that the matching
policy acts on each worker’s history, not on the true type of each worker: this is because the
platform is assumed to not know worker types, except as learned through the history itself.
Dynamics. These features completely determine the evolution of the system profile {νt}.
Observe that νt(H, i)pit(H, j|νt) is the total mass of workers of type i with history H who are
matched to jobs of type j at time t, given policy pit and system profile νt.
The system dynamics are then as follows: for all i, j, t, and histories H of length ≤ N − 2,
we have
νt+1(φ, i) = ρˆi ; (2)
νt+1((H, (j, 1)), i) = νt(H, i)pit(H, j|νt)A(i, j) ; (3)
νt+1((H, (j, 0)), i) = νt(H, i)pit(H, j|νt)(1−A(i, j)) . (4)
7In what follows we ultimately consider a steady-state analysis of the dynamical system, and initial conditions
will be irrelevant.
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3.3 Worker-history-only policies
Note that, in general, policies may be time-varying, and may have complex dependence on the
system profile νt. We consider a much simpler class of policies that we call worker-history-only
(WHO) policies. These are policies where there exists a pi such that
pit(H, j|νt) = pi(H, j).
In other words, in a WHO policy, the fraction of workers with history H who are matched to
jobs of type j does not depend on either time or on the full system profile. We restrict attention
to WHO policies essentially without loss of generality (see Remark 2 below).
The platform operator may choose such a policy using information available in aggregate, such
as the payoff matrix A, or the arrival rates ρˆ or µ for workers and jobs respectively. However, the
only way that system profile information enters into a WHO policy is through the information
in a worker’s history. For example, suppose the platform uses a multiarmed bandit algorithm
at the level of an individual worker’s history to determine the next job they are matched to; in
our model this would be a WHO policy. In this sense, WHO policies are decentralized.
We let ΠN denote the class of WHO policies, for a given N . Observe that a priori, there is
no guarantee that a WHO policy will respect the capacity constraints on jobs. In other words,
it is possible that a WHO policy may imply a match rate to jobs of type j that could exceed
µj . We return to formalization of capacity constraints at the end of this subsection.
Steady state of a WHO policy pi. First, suppose that there are no capacity constraints
(i.e., µj =∞ for all j), and consider the system dynamics (2)–(4), assuming the system initially
starts empty.
For a WHO policy, the dynamics (2)–(4) yields a unique steady state after N time periods;
i.e., νs = νt for all s, t ≥ N . The steady state can be inductively computed over histories of
increasing length: for the base case, i.e., the empty history φ of length zero, we have:
νpi(φ, i) = ρˆi . (5)
Then for any history H of length 0, . . . , N − 2, we have:
νpi((H, (j, 1)), i) = νpi(H, i)pi(H, j)A(i, j) ; (6)
νpi((H, (j, 0)), i) = νpi(H, i)pi(H, j)(1−A(i, j)) . (7)
We refer to the measure νpi as the steady state system profile induced by the policy pi.
Routing matrix of a WHO policy pi. In steady state, pi induces a fraction xpi(i, j) of
the mass of workers of type i that are assigned to type j jobs in each subsequent time step. In
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particular:
xpi(i, j) ,
∑
H νpi(H, i)pi(H, j)∑
H νpi(H, i)
=
∑
H νpi(H, i)pi(H, j)
ρi
. (8)
We call {xpi(i, j)}I×J the routing matrix achieved by the policy pi. This is a (row) stochastic
matrix; i.e., each row sums to 1. Observe that once the system is in steady state, the mass of
demand for jobs of type j from workers of type i in any time period is ρixpi(i, j), and the total
mass of demand for jobs of type j in any time period is
∑
i∈I ρixpi(i, j).
Let XN = {xpi : pi ∈ ΠN } ⊆ [0, 1]|I|×|J | be the set of routing matrices achievable (when each
worker does N jobs) by WHO policies, i.e., pi ∈ ΠN . Again, we note that capacity constraints
are ignored in the definition of XN . In Appendix C, we show that XN is a convex polytope (see
Proposition C.4).
Steady-state rate of payoff generation of a WHO policy pi. A WHO policy pi ∈ ΠN
induces a steady-state routing matrix xpi; in turn, this steady-state routing matrix induces a
steady-state rate of payoff generation WN (pi), defined as follows:
WN (pi) ,
∑
i∈I
ρi
∑
j∈J
xpi(i, j)A(i, j) . (9)
This is the payoff generated per time step in steady-state by the policy pi across the entire
population of jobs and workers, since xpi(i, j) is the mass of workers of type i matched to jobs
of type j, and A(i, j) is the fraction of these matches that generate unit reward. In the sequel,
our goal will be to maximize this rate of payoff generation.
Satisfying capacity constraints. We now return to assuming that jobs are capacitated,
i.e., µj < ∞ for j 6= κ. In our analysis, we restrict attention to WHO policies that satisfy
capacity constraints in steady state. Given the definitions above, this is straightforward: we
restrict attention to WHO policies pi ∈ ΠN such that the steady state routing matrix xpi does
not use any more than mass µj of jobs of type j:∑
i∈I
ρixpi(i, j) ≤ µj ∀j ∈ J . (10)
Any WHO policy pi that satisfies this constraint will ensure capacity constraints are not violated
in steady state (i.e., for t ≥ N). In fact, because we assume the system starts empty, the
following lemma establishes that for any such policy, capacity constraints are never violated.
The lemma is proved in Appendix C.1.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that the system starts empty, i.e., ν0(H, i) = 0 for all H 6= φ, i ∈ I; and
suppose the policy pi satisfies (10). Then at all times t = 0, 1, . . . , the capacity constraint holds,
i.e., at each time t and for each job type j, the mass of workers matched to jobs of type j does
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not exceed µj: ∑
i∈I
∑
H
νt(H, i)pi(H, j) ≤ µj ∀j ∈ J . (11)
Furthermore, the system reaches steady state at t = N − 1 and remains at steady state for all
t ≥ N − 1.
As noted above, the restriction to WHO policies satisfying capacity constraints is essentially
without loss of generality. The following remark formalizes this point.
Remark 2. In Section C.2 in Appendix C, we establish that it suffices to restrict attention to
policies in ΠN that satisfy (10). Formally, for any feasible matching policy pi0, pi1, . . ., there
exists a WHO policy pi satisfying (steady state) capacity constraints (10) that achieves a pay-
off generation rate arbitrarily close to that of the former policy. In particular, WHO policies
satisfying capacity constraints suffice to achieve the highest possible payoff generation rate.
3.4 The optimization problem
We are now in position to state our optimization problem of interest. We want to find a WHO
policy pi that maximizes the the steady-state rate of payoff generation WN (pi), subject to the
capacity constraints (10).8 Formally, we have the the following problem.
maximize WN (pi) ,
∑
i∈I
ρi
∑
j∈J
xpi(i, j)A(i, j) (12)
subject to
∑
i∈I
ρixpi(i, j) ≤ µj ∀j ∈ J ; (13)
xpi ∈ XN . (14)
Since XN is a convex polytope, this is a linear program, albeit a complex one. The complexity
of this problem is hidden in the complexity of the set XN , which includes all possible routing
matrices that can be obtained using WHO policies pi ∈ ΠN . The remainder of our paper
is devoted to solving this problem and characterizing its value, by considering an asymptotic
regime where N →∞.
3.5 The benchmark: Full information setting
We evaluate our performance relative to a natural benchmark: the maximal rate of payoff
generation possible if worker types are perfectly known upon arrival. We will refer to this as the
8This would be the objective, e.g., in a platform where the operator takes a fixed percentage of the total payoff
generated from a match.
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full information setting. In this case, any stochastic matrix is feasible as a routing matrix. Let
D denote the set of all right stochastic matrices:
D =
{
x ∈ R|I|×|J | : x(i, j) ≥ 0;
∑
j∈J
x(i, j) = 1
}
. (15)
Note that any routing matrix in D is implementable by a simple policy if worker types are
perfectly known: given a desired routing matrix x ∈ D, at each time step t we match a fraction
x(i, j) of workers of type i to jobs of type j.
Thus, with known worker types, the maximal rate of payoff generation is given by the solution
to the following optimization problem:
maximize
∑
i∈I
ρi
∑
j∈J
x(i, j)A(i, j) (16)
subject to
∑
i∈I
ρix(i, j) ≤ µj ∀j ∈ J ; (17)
x ∈ D. (18)
We let V ∗ denote the maximal value of the preceding optimization problem, and let x∗ denote
the solution (breaking ties arbitrarily). We further use J ∗full to denote the set of fully utilized
job types
J ∗full , {j ∈ J :
∑
i∈I
ρix
∗(i, j) = µj} . (19)
This linear program is a special case of the “static planning problem” that arises frequently in
the operations literature (see, e.g. [9]). The problem can also be viewed as a version of the
assignment problem due to Shapley and Shubik [44], in which the resources are divisible.
3.6 Regret
We evaluate the performance of a given policy in terms of its regret relative to V ∗. In particular,
given N and a WHO policy pi satisfying (10), we define the regret of pi as V ∗ −WN (pi).
We focus on the asymptotic regime where N →∞, and try to find policies that have “small”
regret in this regime. This asymptotic regime allows us to identify structural aspects of policies
that perform well. In Appendix C (see Proposition C.3), we show that it is relatively “easy” to
design policies that achieve a vanishing regret (and even regret that is within a constant factor
of the smallest possible). The idea is straightforward: informally, when N is large, policies that
“explore” for a vanishing fraction of worker lifetimes will be able to learn the worker’s true type
sufficiently well to yield a rate of payoff generation such that regret converges to zero in the
limit.
For this reason, our analysis focuses on a more refined notion of asymptotic optimality. In
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particular, we focus on developing policies that achieve a nearly optimal rate at which the regret
V ∗ −WN (piN ) approaches zero. This is formalized in Theorem 1 below.
3.7 Summary
We summarize our model as follows.
• The platform chooses a WHO policy pi.
• The policy pi induces a steady state system profile νpi and associated steady-state routing
matrix xpi; i.e., if the system starts empty at time t = 0, then at all times t ≥ N the
system profile is νpi, and the mass of workers of type i matched to jobs of type j at each
such time step is xpi(i, j).
• The steady-state routing matrix xpi induces a steady-state rate of payoff generationWN (pi).
• The regret of the policy pi is V ∗ −WN (pi). We focus on finding policies that yield low
regret.
Note that, intuitively, WHO policies have the feature that decisions are taken on the basis of
the history of a given worker, not on the basis of the system profile as a whole. In the sequel, we
will typically refer to pi(Hk, j) as “the probability that a worker of history Hk is matched to a job
of type j.” We use this terminology to make the presentation more intuitive, since the intention
is that our algorithms be implemented at the level of each individual worker’s history. However,
to formalize all our arguments, we emphasize that our proofs translate pi(Hk, j) as the fraction
of workers of history Hk matched to a job type j; this correspondence applies throughout the
technical development.
4 Decentralized Explore-then-Exploit for Matching (DEEM): A
payoff-maximizing policy
In this section we present our proposed policy DEEM: Decentralized Explore-then-Exploit for
Matching. Our main result (Theorem 1) will quantify the regret performance of DEEM and
characterize it as nearly optimal. DEEM is defined in Figure 1.
As defined in Figure 1, DEEM operates on a given worker; we discuss below the fact that
DEEM is a WHO policy, as defined in the preceding section. DEEM is divided into two phases:
Explore and Exploit. In the Explore phase the policy learns the type of the worker with ap-
propriate confidence and generates a type label. In the Exploit phase, the algorithm focuses on
payoff-maximization for the given type label.
9We resolve the issue that DEEM may not be well defined for small N in our practical heuristic inspired by
DEEM (DEEM+, specified in Figure 3), which is well defined for any value of N .
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DEEM: Decentralized Explore-then-Exploit for Matching
Input parameters: I, J , A, ρ, µ, N .
Pre-compute:
• The J -vector p∗ of optimal shadow prices for the capacity constraint (17) in the problem with known
types (16)–(18).
• For each i ∈ I, the set of worker types Str(i) = {i′ : J (i)\J (i′) 6= ∅}, where J (i) = arg maxj∈J A(i, j)−p∗j .
• The distribution α(i) = α(i, I,J , A, p∗,Str(i)) over J , for all i ∈ I. Defined in Figure 2.
• (|I| × |J |)-right stochastic matrix y∗ = y∗(I,J , A, ρ, µ,N) ∈ D. Defined in Figure 2.
1: . Main Routine
2: procedure DEEM . Acts independently on each worker, over her lifetime, from arrival to departure
3: . Initialization:
4: λ(i)← ρi for all i ∈ I . The un-normalized posterior probabilities; initialized to the prior
5: MAP← arg maxi∈I λ(i) . Initialization of the MAP estimate
6: Label← φ . Worker label; initially unassigned, denoted by φ
7: k ← 0 . Number of time steps the worker has been in the system
8: . Explore phase:
9: while Label = φ and k < N do
10: k ← k + 1 . At the next time step
11: Assign job type jk ∼ Explore(N , λ, MAP, α(MAP))
12: Observe reward rk
13: λ(i)← λ(i)× (A(i, jk)1{rk=1} + (1−A(i, jk))1{rk=0}), for all i ∈ I
14: MAP← arg maxi∈I λ(i)
15:
16: if mini 6=MAP λ(MAP)λ(i) ≥ logN and mini∈Str(MAP) λ(MAP)λ(i) ≥ N then . If confirmation is complete
17: Label← MAP . Worker label assigned. Will end Explore phase.
18: end if
19: end while
20: . Exploit phase:
21: while k < N do
22: k ← k + 1 . At the next time step
23: Assign job type jk ∼ Exploit(Label, y∗)
24: end while
25: end procedure
26: . Functions
27: function Explore(N , λ, MAP, αMAP)
28: if mini 6=MAP λ(MAP)λ(i) < logN then . If MAP estimate is noisy
29: dist← Uniform(J ) . Guessing
30: else . MAP estimate is somewhat confident
31: dist← αMAP . Confirmation
32: end if
33: return dist
34: end function
35: function Exploit(Label, y∗)
36: dist← y∗(Label, ·) . Sample from distribution given by the Label-th row of y∗
37: return dist
38: end function
Figure 1: Definition of DEEM. Note that under the generalized imbalance condition (1), the
prices p∗ are uniquely determined; see Proposition C.2 in Appendix C. Also note that the inputs
to Explore() and Exploit() act on the history of the individual worker as described in Remark
3, and so DEEM is a WHO policy.
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Definitions
Definition of α(i, I,J , A, p∗,Str(i)) ∈ ∆(J ).
Let U(i) , maxj∈J A(i, j)− p∗j be the maximal externality-adjusted payoff of worker type i. Define the set
A(i) , arg min
α∈∆(J )
∑
j∈J αj
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
)
mini′∈Str(i)
∑
j∈J αjKL(i, i′|j)
, (20)
where KL(i, i′|j) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between Bernoulli(A(i, j)) and Bernoulli(A(i′, j)), and ∆(J )
is the set of distributions over J . Then choose α(i) such that
α(i) ∈ arg max
α′∈A(i)
min
i′∈Str(i)
∑
j∈J
α′jKL(i, i
′|j), (21)
breaking ties arbitrarily.
Definition of y∗(I,J , A, ρ, µ,N) ∈ D.
The exploration phase, in particular the function Explore() and the confirmation policy α(i) for all i ∈ I,
define the following masses, that are time invariant for all t ≥ N :
• mxplr(i, j) , The mass of type i workers who are in the exploration phase and get assigned to type j jobs
in a given time step.
• l(i, i′) , The mass of type i workers in the system who were labeled as being of type i′ at the end of the
exploration phase, and are now in the Exploit phase.
Then we choose a routing matrix y∗ in the exploitation phase that satisfies:
y(i, j) = 0 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J s.t. x∗(i, j) = 0 ; (22)
m(i, j) = mxplr(i, j) +
∑
i′∈I
l(i, i′)y(i′, j) ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J ; (23)
∑
i∈I
m(i, j) = µj ∀j ∈ J ∗full ; (24)∑
i∈I
m(i, j) < µj ∀j ∈ J \J ∗full ; (25)
y ∈ D. (26)
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that the generalized imbalance condition is satisfied. Then, for any N large enough,
there exists a feasible routing matrix y∗ such that (22)-(26) hold.
Figure 2: Definitions of α(i) and y∗. The Kullback-Leibler divergence between Bernoulli(q) and
Bernoulli(q′) is defined as q log(q/q′)+(1−q) log((1−q)/(1−q′)) . In Appendix B, we show that
(20) can be expressed as a small linear program (with |I| constraints and |J | variables). The
quantitym(i, j) given by (23) represents the mass of type i workers that is matched to type j jobs
in steady state. Proposition 4.1 shows that (22)-(26) is feasible;9 in fact, mxplr(i, j) = o(1) ∀i, j
and l(i, i′) = o(1) ∀i 6= i′, and we show there is a feasible solution such that y∗ = x∗ + o(1).
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The Explore phase involves two possible modes of operation: Guessing and Confirmation, and
starts in Guessing mode. The Guessing mode is in effect when there is not enough confidence
in the maximum a-posteriori (MAP) estimate of the worker type based on the observations
so far. It assigns the worker to job types uniformly at random and aims to generate a fairly
confident preliminary guess of the worker type. The Confirmation mode boosts the confidence
that the guessed type is correct, trying to rule out types in the carefully defined set Str(MAP)
(defined in Figure 1), that must be distinguished to facilitate exploitation. It achieves this goal
while minimizing the loss in payoff by sampling job types from an appropriate distribution α(i),
defined in Figure 2.
DEEM uses externality adjustments on payoffs in order to capture the effect of system-wide
aggregate capacity constraints. These adjustments are achieved by using shadow prices p∗ for the
capacity constraint (17) in the problem with known worker types. Under these adjusted payoffs,
a particular worker type may have multiple optimal job types. Appropriate tie-breaking across
these types in the Exploit phase is necessary to satisfy the aggregate capacity constraints. This
is achieved by employing a specifically designed routing matrix y∗ (defined in Figure 2, which is
a perturbed version of the solution x∗ to the problem with known worker types (16)-(18).
In the next section, we use an example to illustrate the operation of DEEM. Before we
continue, we make three important remarks.
Remark 3. DEEM is a WHO policy. Observe that DEEM as defined in Figure 1 is a WHO
policy; in other words, DEEM defines a mapping from worker history to a distribution over job
types. The input parameters are the model primitives, which are then used to pre-compute the
derived quantities p∗, Str(i) ∀i, α(i) ∀i, and y∗; these are all functions of model primitives only,
with no dependence on the current system state. For any individual worker, the control logic of
DEEM relies only on the posterior λ(·), the current MAP estimate, and Label, all of which are
functions of the history of the individual worker. Before Label is set, job types are drawn using
Explore(), whereas after it is set, job types are drawn using Exploit(). These functions again
construct a job type distribution based only on the history of the individual worker as captured
by λ(·), MAP and Label (and model primitives and quantities derived from them).
Remark 4. DEEM satisfies capacity constraints. Proposition 4.1 shows that there is a
feasible solution to the constraints (22)-(26). We use this solution y∗ as the routing matrix
during exploitation. Since the capacity constraints are incorporated in (24) and (25), it follows
that DEEM does not run out of jobs of any type, in any time step.
One possible concern could be that the definition of y∗ depends on DEEM and DEEM itself
depends on y∗. In fact, there is no circularity in the definitions, as explained in the following
remark.
Remark 5. The exploitation routing matrix y∗ is constructed based on the aggregate system
statistics mxplr(i, j) and l(i, i′), that are in turn defined based only on the Explore phase of
DEEM. Note that for each worker DEEM completes the Explore phase before it enters the
Exploit phase. The matrix y∗ is then safely used to define the exploitation phase of DEEM.
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4.1 Key features of DEEM via an example
In this section, we discuss the structure and the main features of DEEM via an example. Consider
a simple setting in the context of a labor platform like Upwork, in which worker skills differ
along two dimensions: Programming and Design. Further, suppose the skill level is binary in
each dimension – each worker either has that skill or doesn’t. Suppose the worker population
is composed of three worker types (in order): Programmers (who only know Programming),
Designers (who only know Design) and Gurus (who know both Programming and Design).
Finally, there are three job types (in order) with the corresponding subsets of relevant skills:
Programming (which only depend on the programming skill), Design (which only depend on the
Design skill) and Mixed (which depend on both skills). Let the payoff matrix (consistent with
the subsets of relevant skills) be:
A =
0.5 0.2 0.10.3 0.8 0.2
0.5 0.8 0.6
 (27)
Let the arrival rates be ρ = [0.4 0.6 0.9]T and the job type capacities be µ = [1 1 1]T .
In this example, the optimal solution to the benchmark problem (16)–(18) with known types
results in the following allocation of the masses of workers to jobs:
ρTx∗ = [ρix∗(i, j)]i∈I,j∈J =
0.4 0 00 0.6 0
0 0.4 0.5
 . (28)
There are three key features of DEEM, that we now discuss.
1. Shadow prices to account for capacity constraints. The intuition behind using p∗ for ex-
ternality adjustment of payoffs under DEEM is that with large N , learning will occur quickly
relative to the worker lifetime, and p∗ will approximate well the shadow prices even with un-
known worker types. At a high-level, DEEM is a near-optimal policy for the unconstrained
externality-adjusted bandit problem:
maximizexpi∈XN
∑
i∈I
ρi
∑
j∈J
xpi(i, j)(A(i, j)− p∗j ). (29)
In our example, the shadow prices corresponding to the capacity constraints in the benchmark
linear program under full information (16)–(18) are p∗ = [0 0.2 0]T .10 DEEM makes job
10This is consistent with the fact that all Design jobs are assigned (but this is not the case for other job types),
and marginal Gurus could generate 0.8 − 0.6 = 0.2 more in payoffs per unit if there were more Design jobs
available.
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assignment decisions based on the externality-adjusted payoff matrix
[A(i, j)− p∗j ]i∈I,j∈J =
0.5 0.0 0.10.3 0.6 0.2
0.5 0.6 0.6
 (30)
instead of the original payoff matrix A. The sets J (i) defined in Figure 1 capture the job types
that maximize the externality-adjusted payoff for worker type i. In our example, J (Programmer) =
{Programming}, J (Designer) = {Design} and J (Guru) = {Design,Mixed}. The routing ma-
trix y∗ in the Exploit phase of DEEM assigns labeled workers exclusively to these jobs during
exploitation, just like x∗ in the benchmark solution exclusively assigns workers to these jobs (see
(28)).
But DEEM also needs to satisfy capacity constraints to be feasible. As implied by the
following fact,11 in general the J (i) may not be singleton sets (as is the case for Gurus) and
appropriate tie-breaking between multiple optimal job types for one or more worker types is
necessary during exploitation to avoid capacity violations.
Fact 1. Under generalized imbalance, as long as there is at least one capacity constraint that
is binding in some optimal solution x∗ to the benchmark problem (16)–(18) with known types,
there is at least one worker i such that x∗(i, ·) is supported on multiple job types. This implies
that J (i) has more than one element.
In DEEM, the exploitation-phase routing matrix y∗ is carefully constructed in (22)–(26) to
achieve the proper tie-breaking (the feasibility of this construction is shown in Proposition 4.1).
Because of this construction, DEEM simultaneously satisfies a) aggregate capacity constraints
and b) complementary slackness conditions with respect to the prices p∗. These properties are
key to showing the near-optimality of DEEM for the original capacity constrained optimization
problem (12).
2. Appropriate learning goals for the Explore phase. DEEM’s tolerance for labeling errors in
the Explore phase depends on their impact on payoffs during exploitation. For instance, in our
example, suppose that at the end of the Explore phase, the algorithm mislabels a Programmer
as a Guru. This has a dire impact on payoffs: the Programmer is then assigned to Design
or Mixed jobs in the exploitation phase (since J (Guru) = {Design,Mixed}), neither of which
are optimal for Programmers. These errors lead to a constant regret relative to the optimal
externality-adjusted payoffs per unit mass of workers per time step.
In fact, in our example, every other kind of mislabeling is also similarly problematic, with one
exception: If a Guru is labeled as a Designer, this is acceptable, since the worker will then be
assigned Design jobs during exploitation, but Design ∈ J (Guru), i.e., J (Designer) ⊂ J (Guru).
11The proof of the fact is straightforward: Fix x∗ such that J ∗full is non-empty. Consider worker types I∗full =
{i : ∃j ∈ J ∗full s.t. x∗(i, j) > 0}. By generalized imbalance and since all worker types are fully matched, there
must be some i ∈ I∗full and j′ /∈ J ∗full such that x∗(i, j′) > 0. (If not,
∑
i∈I∗full
ρi =
∑
j∈J ∗
full
µj , which contradicts
generalized imbalance.)
19
To ensure that capacity constraints do not pose a problem, we nevertheless ensure that even
such “acceptable” mislabeling occurs for only Θ(1/ logN) fraction of workers.
This motivates our definition of the sets Str(i) for each worker type i: this is the set of types
that imust be distinguished from with high confidence, or “strongly” distinguished. In particular,
if J (i)\J (i′) 6= φ then i′ ∈ Str(i). The target error probability for types in Str(i) is chosen to be
1/N (see the second condition in line 15 of Figure 1): if we choose a much larger target, we will
incur a relatively large expected regret during exploitation due to misclassification; if we choose
a smaller target, the exploration phase is unnecessarily long, and we thus incur a relatively
large regret in the exploration phase. In our example Str(Programmer) = {Designer,Guru},
Str(Designer) = {Programmer} and Str(Guru) = {Programmer,Designer}. For every other
type i′ /∈ Str(i), we have J (i) ⊆ J (i′), and we “weakly” distinguish i from such i′, with a target
error probability of 1/ logN (see the first condition in line 15 of Figure 1).
3. Minimizing regret during Confirmation: After quickly obtaining a fairly confident estimate
i for the worker type using the Guessing mode, DEEM attempts to distinguish i from all types in
Str(i) with high confidence using the Confirmation mode. Regret relative to the largest possible
externality-adjusted payoff U(i) = maxj(A(i, j)−p∗j ) for worker type i may be inevitable in this
process. A key feature underlying the near-optimality of DEEM is that it tries to minimize the
regret incurred during Confirmation.
For instance, the only job type that is optimal for Programmers, i.e., Programming, does not
allow the policy to distinguish between Programmers and Gurus. Thus if the guessed worker
type is Programmer, then since Guru ∈ Str(Programmer), during Confirmation DEEM must
assign the worker either Design or Mixed jobs in order to make sure she is not a Guru. Thus
confirming the guess necessitates regret in the event that the guess is correct.
To minimize this regret, DEEM samples job types during Confirmation of worker type i from
the carefully chosen distribution α(i) defined in Figure 2. For a job type distribution α ∈ ∆(J ),
for workers of true type i, the smallest value of the log posterior odds, mini′∈Str(i) log λ(i)/λ(i′),
increases at an expected rate of mini′∈Str(i)
∑
j∈J αjKL(i, i
′|j). In order to confirm i against
worker types in Str(i) with a probability of error of 1/N , the smallest value of log posterior odds
needs to cross the threshold of logN (see second condition on line 15 in Figure 1). The expected
number of jobs needed to cross this threshold is logN/(mini′∈Str(i)
∑
j∈J αjKL(i, i
′|j)). Hence,
the expected externality-adjusted regret incurred during Confirmation is
logN
∑
j∈J αj
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
)
mini′∈Str(i)
∑
j∈J αjKL(i, i′|j)
.
DEEM choses a policy α(i) that minimizes this quantity, which in effect minimizes the ratio
of the rate of regret accumulation and the rate of learning, or informally, the “regret per unit
learning”. In Proposition A.1, we show that this minimal regret of approximately C(i) logN is
inevitable per unit mass of workers of type i for any optimal policy that solves (29) for a large
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N , where
C(i) , min
α∈∆(J )
∑
j∈J αj
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
)
mini′∈Str(i)
∑
j∈J αjKL(i, i′|j)
. (31)
In Appendix B, we show that the above optimization problem reduces to a linear program.
In general this problem can have several optimal solutions, denoted by the set A(i). Of these,
DEEM chooses the one that gives the highest learning rate.12
In our example, U(Programmer) = 0.5, and thus
[U(Programmer)− (A(Programmer, j)− p∗j )]j∈J = [0 0.5 0.4]T . (32)
[KL(Programmer,Designer|j)]j∈J = [DKL(0.5‖0.3) DKL(0.2‖0.8) DKL(0.1‖0.2)]T and (33)
[KL(Programmer,Guru|j)]j∈J = [0 DKL(0.2‖0.8) DKL(0.1‖0.6)]T . (34)
In this case, one can show thatA(Programmer) = {(1−ε, ε, 0) : ε ∈ (0, 1]} and C(Programmer) =
0.5/DKL(0.2‖0.8) ≈ 0.6011. Of these solutions, DEEM picks α(Programmer) = (0, 1, 0) as per
(21), since this distribution is the quickest in confirming a Programmer while possessing the
optimal regret per unit learning (this α achieves the log posterior targets for i′ = Designer and
for i′ = Guru in the same expected time).
On the other hand, Mixed jobs are optimal for Gurus and further allow Gurus to be dis-
tinguished from both Designers and Programmers (both these types are in Str(Guru)). Thus
no regret needs to be incurred while confirming a Guru. Recall that Design jobs are also opti-
mal for Gurus. It is straightforward to verify that A(Guru) = {(0, 1 − ε, ε) : ε ∈ (0, 1]}, and
C(Guru) = 0. The choice of α(Guru) = (0, 0, 1) results in the highest learning rate as per (21).
The distinction in C(i) for i = Programmer and i = Guru is fundamental, and motivates the
following definition.
Definition 1. Consider a worker type i. Suppose that there exists another type i′ such that
A(i, j) = A(i′, j) for all j ∈ J (i) and i′ ∈ Str(i). Then we say that the ordered pair (i, i′) is a
difficult type pair.13
The constant C(i) > 0 if and only if there is some other i′ such that (i, i′) is a difficult
type pair. In this case, there is a non-trivial (asymptotic) tradeoff between myopic payoffs and
learning, and a regret of Ω(logN) is necessary per unit mass of workers. In the above example,
(Programmer, Guru) is a difficult type pair.
12In Appendix B, we show that this choice is well defined, despite the fact that A(i) could be an open set.
13A similar definition also appears in [1]; the modification here is that the sets J (i) are defined with respect
to externality-adjusted payoffs to account for capacity constraints.
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5 Main result
Our main result is the following theorem. In particular, we prove a lower bound on the regret
of any policy, and show that DEEM (essentially) achieves this lower bound.
Theorem 1. Fix (ρ, µ,A) such that: (a) no two rows of A are identical; and (b) the generalized
imbalance condition holds. Then if C ,
∑
i∈I ρiC(i) > 0, then,
1. (Lower bound) For any N and any WHO policy pi that is feasible for (12)–(14),
V ∗ −WN (pi) ≥ C logN
N
(
1 + o(1)
)
and (35)
2. (Upper bound) DEEM is feasible for (12)–(14) for an N large enough, with:
V ∗ −WN (DEEM) ≤ C logN
N
(
1 + o(1)
)
. (36)
If instead C = 0, then DEEM is feasible for (12)–(14) for an N large enough, with:
V ∗ −WN (DEEM) ≤ O
(
log logN
N
)
. (37)
Recall that C(i) (defined in (31)), and hence the constant C, depend on the primitives of the
problem, i.e., (ρ, µ,A). As we have discussed above, a necessary and sufficient condition for C
to be strictly positive is that there exists at least one difficult pair of worker types (i, i′). Below
in Section 5.1 we show that in a setting where workers are heterogeneous along more than one
skill dimension, and some job type allows to distinguish only a subset of skills, “many” problem
instances contain such difficult type pairs, i.e., there is often a non-trivial (asymptotic) tradeoff
between myopic payoffs and learning.
5.1 Difficult type pairs occur frequently with multiple skill dimensions
In Section 4.1 we saw a simple and natural example with two skill dimensions that included a
difficult type pair. In this subsection, we show that difficult type pairs occur frequently when
there is more than one skill dimension.
Again taking Upwork as an example, one of the categories on this platform is “Web Develop-
ment” and there are a number of relevant “Skills”, for example: HTML development, WordPress,
Python, JavaScript, Payment Gateway Integration and Web Design. A typical web developer
has a subset of these skills. For each of these skill dimensions there may be distinct levels: e.g.,
missing/inexpert/expert. The platform may have a prior but learns about a developer’s skill
along a certain dimension chiefly by observing outcomes. Moreover, job listings are heteroge-
neous in terms of the relevant skills. For example, a project requiring the skills Web Design and
WordPress would reveal some information about these skill dimensions, but not whether the
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Developer is an expert on HTML development. In this subsection, we formalize a special case
of our model with multiple skill dimensions, and show that difficult type pairs occur frequently
(i.e., in many instances) in such a setup.
Suppose there is a set S of skill dimensions, and a worker type i is a tuple i = (i1, i2, ..., i|S|),
where each is ∈ Is captures the skill level of the worker in dimension s. Here Is is a finite set
for each s, and the set of worker types I ⊆ I1×I2×· · ·×I|S|. For each job type j ∈ J , there is
a non-empty subset of relevant skill dimensions Sj ⊆ S, and the expected payoff A(i, j) is then
a function fj((is)s∈Sj ). Without loss of generality, assume that ∪j∈JSj = S, since if this is not
true, we can safely ignore the (irrelevant) skills in S\( ∪j∈J Sj) given that they do not matter
for any job type (multiple worker types that differ only on irrelevant skills can be collapsed into
a single worker type). Then the following assumption on (I,J ,S, (Sj)j∈J ) is very plausible if
there are at least two skill dimensions |S| ≥ 2.
Assumption 1. There is a job type j ∈ J and a pair of worker types i ∈ I and i′ ∈ I such
that: (i) a strict subset Sj ⊂ S of skills is relevant to job type j, (ii) worker types i and i′ differ
only on skill dimensions in S\Sj.
The assumption implies that job type j cannot distinguish between worker types i and i′.
We establish the following result, showing that under Assumption 1, many instances have
difficult type pairs. In particular, difficult type pairs do not occur only on a knife edge.
Proposition 5.1. Fix I, J , S and (Sj)j∈J such that Assumption 1 holds. Also fix capacity
constraints µ = (µ(j))j∈J . Consider the set of possible instances
P = {(ρ,A) ∈ R|I|++ × [0, 1]|I||J | : A(·, j) is consistent with Sj for all j ∈ J } . (38)
Note that the arrival rate vector ρ has |I| degrees of freedom, and j-th column of the payoff
matrix A(·, j) has |ISj | degrees of freedom, where
ISj = {(is)s∈Sj : ∃i′ ∈ I s.t. i′s = is∀s ∈ Sj} , (39)
is the set of distinct worker type classes that arise when worker types are projected onto Sj. Then
the subset of instances
Pdiff = {(ρ,A) ∈ P : there is a difficult type pair} (40)
has full dimension |I|+∑j∈J |ISj |, equal to the dimension of P.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Starting with Assumption 1, the main idea is to construct an instance
such that in any solution under the full information setting, the worker type i will be matched
exclusively to job type j, whereas the type i′ will be matched exclusively to jobs types other
than j. And that this remains true in a neighborhood of the given set of parameters.
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Let j be the job type and i and i′ be the worker types corresponding to Assumption 1. Let
j′ be some other job type such that i′ differs from i on Sj′ . (Since Sj ⊂ S, but ∪jˆ∈JSjˆ = S, it
follows that there is such a job type j′.) Let A(i, j) = 1/2. Let I(i,Sj) denote the set of worker
types whose skill levels along dimensions in Sj are identical to (is)s∈Sj . Then, by definition of
Sj , we have A(ˆi, j) = A(i, j) = 1/2 for all iˆ ∈ I(i,Sj). (In particular, A(i′, j) = 1/2.) Also let
A(i′, j′) = 3/4, and as above, it follows that A(ˆi′, j′) = A(i′, j′) = 3/4 for all iˆ′ ∈ I(i′,Sj′). Let
all other terms in the payoff matrix A be 1/4.
Let ρ(i) = µ(j)/3, ρ(i′) = µ(j′)/3 and let ρ(ˆi) =
minjˆ∈J µ(jˆ)
3|I| for all iˆ /∈ {i, i′}. It follows that
in any optimal solution x∗ to the SPP (16)-(18), we have:
(i) For all job types jˆ ∈ J , the capacity constraint (17) is slack and so the shadow price
p∗(jˆ) = 0.
(ii) Worker type i has a unique optimal job type J (i) = {j} which it is exclusively and fully
matched to, i.e., we have x∗(i, j) = 1.
(iii) Worker type i′ has a unique optimal job type J (i′) = {j′} which it is exclusively and
fully matched to, i.e., we have x∗(i′, j′) = 1.
(iv) All other worker types are fully matched,14 i.e., we have
∑
jˆ∈J x
∗(ˆi, jˆ) = 1 for all iˆ ∈
I\{i, i′}.
In fact, it is easy to check that the above properties hold for any instance in a neighborhood of the
instance above (Here any metric, e.g., the L∞ distance between instances, can be employed for
the purpose of defining the neighborhood). It follows that for any instance in a neighborhood of
the above instance, the pair (i, i′) is a difficult type pair. It follows that Pdiff has full dimension.
6 Proof sketch
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A. Here we present a sketch. The critical
ingredient in the proof is the following relaxed optimization problem in which there are no
capacity constraints, but capacity violations are charged with non-negative prices p∗ from the
optimization problem (16)-(18) with known worker types.
WNp∗ = max
x∈XN
∑
i∈I
ρi
∑
j∈J
x(i, j)A(i, j)−
∑
j∈J
p∗j
[∑
i∈I
ρix(i, j)− µj
]
. (41)
Lower bound on regret. If C > 0 (i.e., if there is at least one difficult pair of worker
types; cf. Section 5), there is an upper bound on the performance of any policy in this problem,
14In this instance, type iˆ is matched to arbitrary job types since J (ˆi) = J given equal payoffs for all job types,
and excess capacity. In neighboring instances, type iˆ will be matched to job types in J (ˆi), i.e., those with the
highest payoffs in that instance.
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expressed relative to V ∗. This result follows directly from [1]:
WNp∗ ≤ V ∗ −
C logN
N
(1 + o(1)).
By a standard duality argument, we know thatWN ≤WNp∗ , and hence this bound holds forWN
as well (see Proposition A.1), yielding the lower bound on regret on our original problem (12).
Upper bound on regret. There are two key steps in proving that DEEMN is feasible for
problem (12)–(14), and WN (DEEMN ) ≥ V ∗ − C(logN/N)(1 + o(1)).
1. First, we show that DEEM, with an arbitrary exploitation-phase routing matrix y∗ sup-
ported on J (i) for each i ∈ I, achieves near optimal performance for the vanilla multi-armed
bandit problem (41). Formally, if (with some abuse of notation) we let WNp∗ (pi) denote the value
attained by a policy pi in problem (41), i.e.,
WNp∗ (pi) =
∑
i∈I
ρi
∑
j∈J
xpi(i, j)A(i, j)−
∑
j∈J
p∗j
[∑
i∈I
ρixpi(i, j)− µj
]
,
then
V ∗ −WNp∗ (DEEMN ) = C(logN/N)(1 + o(1))
if C > 0 and
V ∗ −WNp∗ (DEEMN ) = O(log logN/N)
if C = 0. This is shown in15 Proposition A.2. Thus we haveWNp∗ (DEEMN ) ≥WNp∗−o(logN/N),
i.e., DEEM is near-optimal in problem (41).
2. In the next part of the proof, we show that we can design an exploitation-phase routing
matrix y∗ (that depends on N) that satisfies conditions (22)-(26). In particular, the resulting
routing matrix xDEEMN , as defined in (8), satisfies the following conditions:
(a) (Complementary slackness)
∑
i∈I ρixDEEMN (i, j)−µj = 0 for all j such that p∗j > 0, and,
(b) (Feasibility)
∑
i∈I ρixDEEMN (i, j)− µj ≤ 0 for all other j ∈ J .
This is shown in Proposition 4.1 and the basic idea is as follows. At the end of the exploration
phase of DEEM, the correct label of the worker is learned with a confidence of at least (1−o(1)).
This fact, coupled with the generalized imbalance condition (leading to flexibility in modifying
x∗), is sufficient to ensure an appropriate and feasible choice of y∗ = x∗ + o(1) will correct the
deviations from x∗ in terms of capacity utilizations of job types with p∗j > 0 (these deviations
arise because of the short exploration phase, and because of the infrequent cases in which
exploitation is based on an incorrect worker label coming out of the exploration phase).
We deduce that DEEMN with this choice of y∗ in the exploitation phase is feasible for
15[1] proves this result for a similar policy.
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problem (12)–(14) and the complementarity slackness property implies that WN (DEEMN ) =
WNp∗ (DEEMN ), yielding our upper bound on regret.
7 Practical considerations and a heuristic
Although DEEM minimizes the leading order term of regret, it is defined in the context of the
continuum model. It is unclear how to implement this policy in practice. In this section, we
present a heuristic derived from DEEM called DEEM+ , which is (1) practically implementable
in a market environment, and (2) is optimized for small N performance. DEEM+ is defined in
Figures 3 and 4. Similar to DEEM, DEEM+ is a decentralized algorithm that acts individually
on each worker entering the platform. DEEM+ results from a practical approach to managing
capacity constraints via dynamic queue-based shadow prices, combined with a few key modifica-
tions to DEEM that we conjecture preserve the leading order regret optimality in the asymptotic
regime, but nevertheless improve performance when N is finite. We discuss these changes below.
7.1 Dynamic queue-based shadow prices
A key step in making DEEM practical is to use dynamic shadow prices based on supply-demand
imbalances in the market. In our mathematical model, we had assumed that the masses of
new workers and jobs arrive instantaneously at the beginning of each period, after which they
are instantaneously matched. Further, each job either gets matched immediately on arrival or
disappears at the end of the period. However, in real platforms, the arrivals, departures, and
matchings of workers and jobs occur sequentially in continuous time. A more natural model for
these settings is to maintain a “queue” of jobs of each type that grows when new jobs arrive
(in continuous time) and shrinks when existing jobs are matched. In this scenario, the queue
length at any time can be leveraged to compute an instantaneous shadow price for the job
type that can be utilized for externality adjustment of the payoffs for each worker.16 Each new
worker corresponds to a multi-armed bandit problem that gets “adjusted” under DEEM+ by the
instantaneous prices in the market when the worker arrives, to account for the externalities due
to the presence of the capacity constraints. These prices remain fixed throughout the lifetime
of the worker; this is analogous to having p∗ be the fixed prices under DEEM.
Suitably defined time-varying prices can be used as a feedback control mechanism to stabilize
the job queue lengths (a queue length changes at epochs when a job is assigned to a worker or
a new job arives), and hence stabilize the prices themselves. We use a Proportional-Derivative
(PD) control based definition of instantaneous prices. Technical details of the controller design
are provided in Appendix D.
Our definition of the prices based on queue-lengths does not depend on the vector of job arrival
rates µ. It also obviates the need to explicitly compute y∗ in the exploitation phase of DEEM;
16Such pricing based on queue lengths is commonly utilized in designing distributed algorithms for resource
allocation, e.g., for congestion control in communication networks [43, 46].
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DEEM+ : A practical heuristic for finite N
Input parameters: I, J , A, ρ, N , queue-based prices pq.
Pre-compute:
• The sets J q(i) defined in (42) for each worker type i ∈ I.
• The set of worker types Strq(i) and Weakq(i) defined in Definition 2 for all i ∈ I.
• The maximal externality adjusted payoffs Uq(i) for all i ∈ I defined in (43) and the maximal per-step
mislabeling regrets R(i, i′) for all i, i′ ∈ I defined in (44)–(45).
1: . Main Routine
2: procedure DEEM+ . Acts independently on each worker, over her lifetime, from arrival to departure
3: . Initialization:
4: λ(i)← ρi for all i ∈ I . The un-normalized posterior probabilities; initialized to the prior
5: MAP← arg maxi∈I λ(i) . Initialization of the MAP estimate
6: Label← ∅ . Worker label; initially unassigned, denoted by ∅
7: k ← 0 . Number of time steps the worker has been in the system
8: . Explore phase:
9: while Label = ∅ and k < N do
10: Assign job type jk ∼ Explore(N , λ, MAP) . At the next time step
11: Observe payoff rk
12: λ(i)← λ(i)× (A(i, jk)1{rk=1} + (1−A(i, jk))1{rk=0}), for all i ∈ I
13: MAP← arg maxi∈I λ(i)
14:
15: if mini∈Strq(MAP) λ(MAP)λ(i)R(MAP,i) ≥ N then . if confirmation is complete
16: Label← MAP . Worker label assigned. Will cause while loop to exit.
17: end if
18: k ← k + 1
19: end while
20: . Exploit phase:
21: while k < N do
22: Assign job type jk = Exploit(λ) . At the next time step
23: k ← k + 1
24: end while
25: end procedure
26: . Functions
27: function Explore(N , λ, MAP )
28: if mini∈Strq(MAP)∪Weakq(MAP) λ(MAP)λ(i)R(MAP,i) < logN then . if MAP estimate is noisy
29: dist← αguess(λ) . Guessing
30: else . MAP estimate is somewhat confident
31: dist← αconf(MAP, λ) . Confirmation
32: end if
33: return dist
34: end function
35: function Exploit(λ)
36: j∗ = arg maxj∈J
∑
i∈I λ(i)
[
A(i, j)− pqj
]
. Greedy
37: return j∗
38: end function
Figure 3: Definition of DEEM+ . The prices pq depend on the queue-lengths of the different job
types, as discussed in Section 7.1, and formally defined in Appendix D.
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39: function αguess(λ)
40: For each j ∈ J , define . Thompson sampling
αj =
(∑
i∈I
λ(i)
Ij∈J q(i)
|J q(i)|
)/∑
i∈I
λ(i)
41: return α = (αj)j∈J
42: end function
43: function αconf(MAP, λ)
44: Define the set
A = arg min
α∈∆(J )
{[∑
i∈I
λ(i)
∑
j∈J
αj
(
Uq(i)− [A(i, j)− pqj ]
)][
max
i′∈Strq(MAP)
logN + logR(MAP, i′)∑
j∈J αjKL(MAP, i′|j)
]}
45: Choose any
α ∈ arg min
α′∈A
max
i∈Strq(MAP)
logN + logR(MAP, i)∑
j∈J α
′
jKL(MAP, i|j)
46: return α
47: end function
Figure 4: Definition of DEEM+ (continued).
instead the Exploit phase can be implemented by allocating optimally for each worker given the
queue-based prices that were supplied to the worker when the worker arrived. Natural (small)
fluctuations in prices that arise in the process of stabilizing queue lengths result in appropriate
tie-breaking in allocation (tie-breaking is typically needed; see Fact 1), with randomization
occurring across workers. The resulting stability of the queue-lengths implies that the capacity
constraints are satisfied.
7.2 Optimizing the Explore phase for finite N
DEEM+ shares the same explore-then-exploit structure as DEEM, but with a few changes to
the exploration phase to optimize learning for finite N . These changes are discussed below.
1. Refining learning goals. Recall that in DEEM, we achieve a 1/ logN probability of
error of misclassifying i′ as i even if J (i) ⊆ J (i′). In DEEM+ , because we use queue-based
prices, the counterparts of the sets J (i) are the sets
J q(i) , arg max
j∈J
A(i, j)− pqj (42)
for each i ∈ I. These are the set of job types that are optimal for worker type i under the queue-
based prices pq. Because of natural fluctuations in the prices across jobs, these sets are typically
singletons and hence for any two types i and i′, either J q(i)∩J q(i′) = ∅ or J q(i) = J q(i′). In the
latter case, it would appear wasteful to achieve a 1/ logN probability of error of misclassifying
i′ as i, except in the case where the optimal confirmation policies for the two types are different,
since confirming using a sub-optimal job sampling policy leads to an increase in leading order
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regret.17 Thus in DEEM+ , for each worker type i, we define the sets of types it needs to be
distinguished from as follows (the definition does not assume that the sets J q(i) are singletons).
Definition 2. For each i, i′ ∈ I,
(a) i′ ∈ Strq(i) if J q(i) \ J q(i′) 6= ∅.
(b) i′ ∈Weakq(i) if J q(i) ⊆ J q(i′) and α(i, I,J , A, pq, Strq(i)) 6= α(i′, I,J , A, pq, Strq(i′)).
In the guessing mode, DEEM+ explicitly distinguishes i only from types in Strq(i)∪Weakq(i)
(see line 28 and the first condition in line 15 in Figure 3). If, at some point in the Explore phase,
type i has been confirmed against all types in Strq(i), then the algorithm can safely proceed
to the Exploit phase even if i has not been weakly distinguished from some i′ ∈ Weakq(i); the
latter distinction is rendered unnecessary in this case. This change accounts for the difference
in the conditions for transitioning from Explore to Exploit on line 16 of DEEM versus line 15
of DEEM+ .
Next, recall that DEEM tries to achieve a probability 1/N of misclassifying a worker of type
i′ as type i for any i ∈ Str(i). For small N , however, we can do better: the desired probability
of error should depend on the largest regret that type i′ could incur by performing a job that is
optimal for i but not for i′: if this regret is very small, then it isn’t worth trying to make this
distinction with high precision. For each i ∈ I, define the maximal externality adjusted payoffs
U q(i) , max
j∈J
A(i, j)− pqj . (43)
Then for each i′ ∈ Strq(i), define:
R(i, i′) , max
j∈J q(i), j /∈J q(i′)
U q(i′)− [A(i′, j)− pqj ]. (44)
We informally refer to R(i, i′) as the maximal per-step regret of mislabeling i′ as i. For i′ /∈ Str(i),
it will be convenient to (arbitrarily) define:
R(i, i′) , 1. (45)
DEEM+ aims for a probability of mislabeling i′ as i of 1/((logN)R(i, i′)) instead of 1/ logN
at the end of guessing for all i′ ∈ Strq(i) ∪Weakq(i), and of 1/(NR(i, i′)) instead of 1/N at the
end of Explore for all i′ ∈ Strq(i). These changes account for the fact that if R(i, i′) is small,
then we can tolerate a higher probability of error (see line 15 in Figure 3). This modification is
especially important in preventing wasteful learning in cases where price fluctuations (necessary
for tie-breaking, see Section 7.1) result in J q(i) ( J q(i′) even though J (i) ⊆ J (i′).
17In DEEM, we made this distinction even when the confirmation policies for the two types are the same since
leading order regret is unaffected, and because it allowed us to leverage the solution to the problem with known
worker types to obtain a policy with provable guarantees that satisfies capacity constraints (see the construction
of y∗ in the proof of Proposition 4.1 in Appendix A). The resulting key property is that shadow prices remain
close to those under known worker types, and happily, we observe that this latter property holds under DEEM+
in our experiments (see Table 1 in Section 8 below).
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2. Incorporating the posterior during Explore. The final change we propose is to
explicitly incorporate the posterior into the Explore phase. First, recall that in DEEM, guessing
involves the naive approach of exploring uniformly at random. When N is finite, we can reduce
regret by instead leveraging the posterior at each round to appropriately allocate learning effort
across the different types until we form a good guess for the worker type. In DEEM+ , we do
so by using a price-adjusted version of Thompson sampling (TS), which is a popular Bayesian
multi-armed bandit algorithm, during the guessing phase. Under this algorithm, a worker type
is sampled from the posterior distribution and the job type that maximizes the price-adjusted
payoff for this sampled worker type is assigned to the worker; if there are multiple such types,
one type is chosen uniformly at random. This is defined in the function αguess in Figure 4.
Similarly, the posterior can also be incorporated in minimizing expected regret during the
confirmation phase. This is captured by the function αconf defined in Figure 4. This function
returns a sampling distribution that maximizes the product of the expected per-time-step regret
relative to the maximal externality-adjusted payoffs (the term in the first parenthesis in the
objective on line 44) and the estimated time until the confirmation of the MAP estimate assuming
it is correct (the term in the second parenthesis in the objective in line 44). If there are multiple
solutions, αconf is chosen to be the one with the smallest time until confirmation (line 45).
Observe that as λ(MAP)/(
∑
i∈I λ(i))→ 1 for the MAP estimate, the objective function in line
44 in the definition of αconf converges to the objective function for computing α(MAP) in (20),
modulo the (logN+logR(i, i′)) factors that simply capture the fact that the learning goals have
been adjusted for small N .
7.3 Optimizing the Exploit phase for finite N
In DEEM+ , we tweak the approach in the Exploit phase of DEEM to improve performance:
instead of optimizing the price-adjusted payoff for the confirmed worker label, we can maximize
the expected payoff with respect to the posterior distribution, thus accounting for the possibility
that we may have confirmed incorrectly. This is reflected in the new definition of the Exploit()
function on line 35. We find that this change significantly improves performance.
8 Simulations
In this section, we simulate DEEM+ in a market environment with queue-based shadow prices
and compare its performance against other policies. We first present the details of the simulation.
Instances. Building upon our example in Section 4.1, we consider instances with 4 types of
workers arising from a two dimensional skill set, namely Programming (P) and Design (D). Each
type either has or doesn’t have a skill. Let the type space be defined as I = {00, 01, 10, 11}
where the first (resp., second) bit of each type signifies whether or not the worker has skill P
(resp., D). There are 3 types of jobs, denoted by the set J = {Programming, Design, Mixed}.
Programming jobs benefit from skill P, Design jobs benefit from skill D, and Mixed jobs require
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both skills P and D. Formally, Programming jobs have they same payoff for 00 and 01 worker
types (and thus cannot distinguish them); and they also have the same payoff for 10 and 11
worker types (and thus cannot distinguish them). Similarly, Design jobs have the same payoff
for 00 and 10 worker types, and for 01 and 11 worker types. Mixed jobs can distinguish all
worker types. Thus the 4 × 3 A matrix is fully specified by 8 payoff entries: (1) Programming
job payoffs for 00/01 and 10/11 worker types; (2) Design job payoffs for 00/10 and 01/11 worker
types; and (3) Mixed job payoffs for all four types.
The interpretation of types based on skill levels implies a natural order on the payoffs: a
Programming job’s expected payoff for the 00/01 types will be smaller than that for the 10/11
types, and similarly a Design job’s expected payoff for the 00/10 types will be smaller than that
for the 01/11 types. Finally, we arbitrarily assume that Programming skills are more important
than Design skills for Mixed jobs, and hence the expected payoff for these jobs is increasing
in the type sequence 00, 01, 10, and 11 (this assumption is without loss of generality since we
can swap the roles of Programming and Design arbitrarily across instances). Notice that an A
matrix with this structure satisfies Assumption 1.
We assume that ρi = 0.5 for each worker type i. We first generated 10, 000 instances, where
for each instance: (1) µj is sampled independently across j from a uniform distribution on [1/3, 1]
(thus, the expected sum of job arrival rates is 2, equal to the mass of workers in the system at
any time); and (2) for each of the job types, the payoffs for different worker types are assigned
to be the appropriate order statistics of independent uniformly generated random variables in
[0, 1], so that the payoffs are monotonic in skills. We found that out of the 10000 instances,
8301 instances, i.e., ≈ 83%, had a difficult type pair. The fact that a non-trivial fraction of
instances have a difficult type pair is consistent with Proposition 5.1. We then randomly chose
350 instances of those that had at least one difficult type pair and focused on these instances
for our simulations.
For our simulations, we consider N ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40}. Given an instance (ρˆ, N, µ,A), our
simulated marketplace is described as follows.
Arrival process. Time is discrete, t = 1, 2, · · · , T , where we assume T ∈ (200, 400, 600, 800)
for N ∈ (10, 20, 30, 40) respectively. At the beginning of each time period t, a fixed MN (i)
number of workers of type i arrive and they stay for N periods. We choose MN (i) = 600/N
for the different values of N for each i, so that irrespective of N , the total number of workers
of any type i present in the market at any time t is MN (i) × N = 600 (making a total of
600 × |I| = 600 × 4 = 2400 workers present in the market at any time). Relating back to the
continuum model, here we implicitly assume that a mass of 0.5 corresponds to 600 workers or
jobs. Observe that MN (i) being the same for all i ∈ I reflects the fact that ρ(i) = 0.5 for all i.
Job matching decisions are sequentially made for each of the 2400 workers in each time step
in an arbitrary order. Between successive allocations, a job of type j arrives with probability
µj/
∑
i∈I ρi for each type j. Thus the relative proportions of the number of workers of different
types that are present in the market at any time, and the expected number of jobs that arrive in
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the market in any time step are proportional to ρi and µj for i ∈ I and j ∈ J , where a mass of
1 corresponds to 1200 workers or jobs. We assume that each job takes one period to complete.
Queues and queue-based prices. As described earlier, we utilize a PD-control mechanism
to set prices with the goal of stabilizing queue lengths; the details are presented in Appendix D.
Queue-lengths change at epochs where either a job arrives or it is assigned to a worker. The
arriving jobs accumulate in queues for the different types, each with a finite buffer of capacity
B, where we choose B = 50, 000. If the buffer capacity is exceeded for some job type then the
remaining jobs are lost.18
Matching process. In the period when a worker arrives, when a job matching decision is
made for the worker for the very first time, the instantaneous price at that time is assigned to
the worker. This price is utilized by the policy in determining the job allocations for the worker
throughout her lifetime.
At every job matching opportunity, an assignment is generated by the chosen policy based
on the assigned price and the history of assignments and outcomes for the worker. If a job of the
required type is unavailable, then the worker remains unmatched. For each worker-job match, a
random payoff is realized, drawn from the distribution specified by A, and the assignment-payoff
tuple is added to the history of the worker.
Simulation output. We look at two main outputs: the average performance and the prices
assigned to the workers.
1. Performance Ratio (PR): For the performance measure, we compute the average re-
ward per worker over the last T/4 periods of the simulation horizon (so that the mean queue-
lengths have had a sufficient time to stabilize) and divided it by the optimal per worker reward
under the full information setting (i.e., the optimal value of (16) divided by
∑
i∈I ρi). We call
this quantity the performance ratio (PR) of the instance. The average PR over the 350 instances
is a proxy for the performance of a fixed policy for a given N .
2. Average queue-based prices p¯qj : We also examine the prices for the different job types
seen by the workers that arrived in the last T/4 periods. We look at the average price over
these periods for each job type j, denoted by p¯qj , and also the magnitude of typical fluctuations
in prices around their average values. The main goal here is to investigate how these prices
compare with p∗.
8.1 Benchmark Policies
Along with DEEM+ , we implemented two other policies. These policies are formally defined in
Appendix E.
18The buffer capacity B plays an important role in the price control mechanism; see Appendix D. In our
simulations, we use a large buffer to keep the price fluctuations small in order to not confound the observed
performance of DEEM+ and other benchmark policies by the uncertain effect of large price fluctuations.
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1. PA-TS: We consider an extension of Thompson sampling (TS) [4] adapted to our setting,
in which the payoffs are adjusted by queue-based prices to account for capacity constraints. We
denote this policy as PA-TS (for “price-adjusted Thompson sampling”). PA-TS is formally
defined in Figure 7 in the Appendix. TS is a popular Bayesian multi-armed bandit algorithm
and is a natural benchmark for our setting (with the incorporation of queue-based prices, as
we propose). TS explores due to sampling from the posterior distribution of the true (worker)
type; the exploration is more aggressive in the early stages when the posterior is not sufficiently
concentrated. Owing to sufficient exploration, it is known to attain the optimal leading order of
regret in several settings [5, 41], but not necessarily the optimal constant factor for the leading
term.
2. TS-DEEM+ : We also consider a policy that is a hybrid of DEEM+ and TS that also uses
queue-based prices for payoff adjustment to account for capacity constraints. We will denote
this policy as TS-DEEM+ . TS-DEEM+ is formally defined in Figure 8 in the Appendix. This
policy operates individually on each worker and has the same two phase structure of DEEM+ ,
consisting of an Explore phase and an Exploit phase. The Exploit phase is identical to that
in DEEM+ , in which the algorithm simply assigns a job that maximizes the expected price-
adjusted payoff at each opportunity. The learning goals of the Explore phase are also identical
to that of DEEM+ : in order to label a worker as being of type i, the probability of misclassifying
i′ as i for any i′ ∈ Strq(i) must be less than 1/N . The only difference is in the way the policy
explores. TS-DEEM+ uses Thompson sampling throughout the Explore phase until the learning
goals are met, unlike DEEM+ , which uses Thompson sampling only in the guessing mode and a
different sampling policy that optimizes the tradeoff between learning and payoff maximization
in the confirmation mode.
Comparing the performance of DEEM+ with PA-TS and TS-DEEM+ allows us to investigate
the relative importance of the two main features of DEEM+ that it inherits from DEEM (the
other important feature being the use of shadow prices for externality-adjustment): (1) Setting
appropriate learning goals and (2) achieving these goals while minimizing regret during the
confirmation mode. As we have seen earlier, both these features are critical to the leading order
regret optimality of DEEM.
We conjecture that both PA-TS and TS-DEEM+ explore sufficiently and are asymptotically
optimal, i.e., the average regret per unit mass of workers converges to 0 as N →∞. But unlike
the confirmation mode in DEEM or DEEM+ , these algorithms don’t optimize the exploration
vs. exploitation tradeoff in a way that is tailored to the instance. Hence, we conjecture that
they do not achieve the optimal leading term of regret.
8.2 Results
Performance comparison. The four panels of Figure 5 show the empirical cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF) over the 350 instances of the per instance PRs (defined in the discussion
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Figure 5: The empirical cumulative distributions of the PRs under the different policies over 350
instances for different values of N . The average PR along with standard error under a policy is
given in the corresponding parenthesis.
on “Simulation output” above) for the three candidate policies, for different values of N . The
average of these ratios over the set of instances for each policy, along with the standard error, is
presented in the legends. As one can observe, both DEEM+ and TS-DEEM+ significantly out-
perform PA-TS by a wide margin under all four settings. This suggests the importance of setting
appropriate learning goals and of focusing only on payoff maximization after the learning goals
have been met. By contrast, PA-TS explores excessively: it keeps exploring beyond the point
where such experimentation has any significant benefit for future payoffs. DEEM+ outperforms
TS-DEEM+ under all four settings as well. This points to the added benefit from having an
optimized confirmation phase, which is central to the leading order regret-optimality of DEEM.
Figure 6 shows the the performance improvement of DEEM+ with growing N .
Prices. Under generalized imbalance (recall condition (1)), the potential capacity violations
due to deviations from the optimal routing during the Explore phase can be corrected in the
Exploit phase by designing a routing matrix y∗ that perturbs x∗ appropriately, but without
changing the shadow prices for large enough N (Proposition 4.1). For finite N , such a correction
that leaves the shadow prices unaffected may not be possible if GI is violated or near-violated.
In these cases, even if p∗ is unique, the shadow prices under unknown worker types may a priori
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N Med. ‖p∗ − p¯q‖∞ (Med. of stdev(pqj))j∈J
10 0.119 (0.011, 0.010, 0.011)
20 0.075 (0.006, 0.006, 0.006)
30 0.057 (0.006, 0.006, 0.006)
40 0.053 (0.007, 0.006, 0.007)
Table 1: First column: median over 350 in-
stances of difference between the queue-based
prices p¯q under DEEM+ and p∗ for different val-
ues of N under the L∞ norm. Second column:
median over 350 instances of the standard devi-
ation of the prices seen by workers in last T/4
periods, under DEEM+ , for the different values
ofN . All values are rounded to 3 decimal places.
be quite different from p∗, and using p∗ for externality adjustment in these cases could prove
to be detrimental to performance. On the other hand our queue-length based implementation
organically discovers the appropriate shadow prices. It is nevertheless interesting to investigate
how different these prices are from p∗.
The first column of Table 1 shows the average and median value of ‖p∗ − p¯q‖∞ under
DEEM+ for different values of N . As expected, the average queue-length based prices p¯q are
close to p∗, and they get closer for larger N . The difference in these prices is small as compared
to the typical range of variation of these prices:the standard deviation of p∗j for j ∈ J (rounded
to 3 decimal places) is (0.512, 0.530, 0.484). The closeness of p∗ and p¯q supports our theoretical
device of using p∗ to approximately capture the externalities due to capacity constraints in the
large N regime. Moreover, we find that the price fluctuations around the mean values p¯q are
relatively small. This can be observed in the second column of Table 1, which shows the median
(rounded to 3 decimals) across the 350 instances, of the standard deviation of the prices seen
by workers in last T/4 periods, for different values of N .
Finally, since the fluctuations of pq around p¯q are very small and p¯q itself is typically close
to p∗, we expect to frequently encounter difficult type pairs in the price-adjusted multi-armed
bandit problems corresponding to the different workers (recall that all 350 instances have a
difficult type pair assuming that the shadow prices are p∗). Indeed, we observed that under
prices p¯q, each of the 350 instances possessed difficult type pairs.
9 Conclusion
This work suggests a novel and practical algorithm for learning while matching, applicable across
a range of online matching platforms. Several directions of generalization remain open for future
work. First, while we consider a finite-type model, a richer model of types would admit a wider
range of applications; e.g., workers and jobs may be characterized by features in a vector-valued
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space, with compatibility determined by the inner product between feature vectors. Second,
while our model includes only one-sided uncertainty, in general a market will include two-sided
uncertainty (i.e., both supply and demand will exhibit type uncertainty). We expect that a
similar approach using externality prices to first set learning objectives, and then achieve them
while incurring minimum regret, should be applicable even in these more general settings.
We conclude by noting that our model ignores strategic behavior by participants. A simple
extension might be to presume that workers are less likely to return after several bad experiences;
this would dramatically alter the model, forcing the policy to become more conservative. The
modeling and analysis of these and other strategic behaviors remain important challenges.
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Appendices
A Proof of Theorem 1
For the rest of this section, recall that:
C(i) = min
α∈∆(J )
∑
j∈J αj
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
)
mini′∈Str(i)
∑
j∈J αjKL(i, i′|j)
; C =
∑
i∈I
ρiC(i) .
Recall optimization problem (12)–(14). We will first show the following lower bound on the
difference between V ∗ and WN , which follows directly from Agrawal et al. [1].
Proposition A.1.
lim sup
N→∞
N
logN
(
V ∗ −WN) ≥ C.
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Proof. Consider the relaxed problem (41) restated here:
WNp∗ = max
x∈XN
∑
i∈I
ρi
∑
j∈J
x(i, j)A(i, j)−
∑
j∈J
p∗j
[∑
i∈I
ρix(i, j)− µj
]
.
By a standard duality argument, we know thatWNp∗ ≥WN . Then from Theorem 3.1 in Agrawal
et al. [1], it follows that
lim sup
N→∞
N
logN
(
V ∗ −WNp∗
) ≥ C.
The result then follows from the fact that WN ≤WNp∗ .
Let WNp∗ (DEEM) be the value attained by DEEM in optimization problem (41). We will
prove an upper bound on the difference between V ∗ and WNp∗ (DEEM), and the only property of
the exploitation phase routing matrix we will use here is that y∗(i, ·) is supported on J (i) for all
i. Note that the difference between WNp∗ (DEEM) and V ∗ is the same as the difference between∑
i∈I
ρi
∑
j∈J
xDEEMN (i, j)(A(i, j)− p∗j ),
and
∑
i∈I ρiU(i). The following is the result.
Proposition A.2. Consider any sequence of WHO policies (pi∗N )N≥1 that has an Explore phase
identical to that of DEEM and such that the routing matrix y used in the exploitation phase
satisfies y(i, ·) ∈ ∆(J (i)) for all i ∈ I. Then,
lim sup
N→∞
N
logN
(
V ∗ −WNp∗ (pi∗N )
) ≤ C.
Further, if C = 0, then,
lim sup
N→∞
N
log logN
(
V ∗ −WNp∗ (pi∗N )
) ≤ K
where K = K(ρ, µ,A) ∈ [0,∞) is some constant.
In order to prove this Proposition, we need a couple of results. First, we need the following.
Lemma A.3. For a fixed worker, let r1, r2, · · · be i.i.d. random variables where rk is the outcome
of choosing a job type jk ∈ J according to a distribution α ∈ ∆(J ), i.i.d. for each k. For any
iˆ ∈ I, let Eiˆ[·] denote expectations and Piˆ(·) denote probabilities of events when the true worker
type is iˆ. Suppose i ∈ I and B ⊆ I \ {i} are such that∑
j∈J
αjKL(i, i′|j) > 0
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for each i′ ∈ B. Let
ΛBk (i) , min
i′∈B
λk(i)/λk(i
′) , where λk (ˆi) , ρiˆ
k∏
k′=1
[
(A(ˆi, jk′)1{rk′=1}+(1−A(ˆi, jk′))1{rk′=0})
] ∀iˆ ∈ I .
Then
1.
lim sup
m→∞
Ei
[
inf
{
k > 0 : ΛBk (i) ≥ m
}]
logm
≤ 1
mini′∈B
∑
j∈J αjKL(i, i′|j)
,
2. For any a > 0,
Pi′
(
max
1≤k≤N
λk(i)/λk(i
′) ≥ a) ≤ ρi/ρi′
a
.
Proof. In order to prove the first statement, we need the following fact from [1]. Let X1, X2, . . .
be i.i.d. r.v.’s on some finite state space X , with marginals p(x). Let f (i) : X → R be such
that 0 < E(f (i)(X1) < ∞, i ∈ I, finite. Let S(i)k = f (i)(X1) + f (i)(X2) + · · · + f (i)(Xk), L(i)a =∑∞
k=1 1{inft≥k S(i)t ≤a}
(this is the last time k that S(i)k takes value ≤ a) , and La = maxi∈I L(i)a
(this is the time after which S(i)k > a for all i ∈ I). Then it is shown in Lemma 4.3 in [1] that
lim sup
a→∞
E(La)
a
≤ 1
mini∈I E(f (i)(X1))
.
If we define Ma = inf{k > 0 : mini∈I S(i)k > a} (this is the time k at which S(i)k > a for all i ∈ I
for the first time), then clearly Ma ≤ La + 1, and thus
lim sup
a→∞
E(Ma)
a
≤ 1
mini∈I E(f (i)(X1))
.
To show that the first statement follows from this, first fix i ∈ I and then map
Xk = (jk, rk),
I = B,
f (i
′)(Xk) = log
(
A(i, jk)1{rk=1} + (1−A(i, jk))1{rk=0}
A(i′, jk)1{rk=1} + (1−A(i′, jk))1{rk=0}
)
,
E(f (i
′)(Xk)) =
∑
j∈J
αjKL(i, i′|j) > 0,
S
(i′)
k = log
(
λk(i)ρi′
λk(i′)ρi
)
.
We can thus conclude that
lim sup
m→∞
Ei
[
inf
{
k > 0 : λk(i)/(λk(i
′) ≥ m(ρi/ρi′) for all i′ ∈ B
}]
logm
≤ 1
mini′∈B
∑
j∈J αjKL(i, i′|j)
.
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Now defining m′ = mmaxi′∈B ρi/ρi′ , we have that
inf
{
k > 0 : λk(i)/(λk(i
′) ≥ m(ρi/ρi′) for all i′ ∈ B
}
≤ inf{k > 0 : λk(i)/(λk(i′) ≥ m′ for all i′ ∈ B}
= inf
{
k > 0 : ΛBk (i) ≥ m′
}
.
Thus we have,
lim sup
m′→∞
Ei
[
inf
{
k > 0 : ΛBk (i) ≥ m′
}]
logm′
≤ lim sup
m′→∞
Ei
[
inf
{
k > 0 : ΛBk (i) ≥ m′
}]
logm′ − log(maxi′∈B ρi/ρi′)
≤ 1
mini′∈B
∑
j∈J αjKL(i, i′|j)
.
To show the second statement, observe that if the true worker type is i, then the sequence(
λk(i
′)ρi
λk(i)ρi′
)
k>0
is a martingale. The statement then follows from Doob’s martingale inequality (see [40]).
Next, we also need the following result. This lemma considers V random walks, each with
positive drift. It shows that the expected time the running minimum of these walks spends
on descending to some specific lower level b for the first time, given that this event occurs, is
bounded uniformly in b, b, and the starting value of each of the V defining random walks.
Lemma A.4. Fix a positive integer V and positive reals M , b and b such that b < b. For
each j = 1, · · · , V , fix reals k(j) ∈ (b, b) and m(j) > 0, and let the random walk S(j)n have a
deterministic starting value k(j) and i.i.d. steps X(j)1 , X
(j)
2 , . . . with mean E(X
(j)
i ) = m
(j) and
bounded as |X(j)i | ≤M ,
S(j)n , k(j) +
n∑
i=1
X
(j)
i .
Let T , inf{n : min1≤j≤V S(j)n < b} and let E , {T <∞}. Then
E[T1E ] ≤ G
for some G = G(V,M, (m(j))j≤V ) <∞ that does not depend on b, b, or (k(j))j≤V .
Proof. Define k(j) − b , z(j). If we define T (j) = inf{n : S(j)n < b} and E(j) = {T (j) <∞} and,
then we have E ⊆ ∪jE(j), and thus we have E[T1E ] ≤
∑V
j=1 E[T1E(j) ] ≤
∑V
j=1 E[T
(j)1E(j) ].
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Now we have
E[T (j)1E(j) ] =
∞∑
n=1
nP(T (j) = n)
≤
∞∑
n=1
nP(
n∑
i=1
Xji ≤ −z(j))
≤
∞∑
n=1
n exp(
−(nm(j) + z(j))2
4nM2
)
=
∞∑
n=1
n exp(−n(m
(j))2
4M2
− m
(j)z(j)
2M2
− (z
(j))2
4nM2
)
≤
∞∑
n=1
n exp(−n(m
(j))2
4M2
) = G(mj ,M) <∞,
where the second inequality results from the Hoeffding bound. Taking G =
∑V
j=1G(m
(j),M)
proves the result.
Proof of Proposition A.2. Let X denote the type of the worker. Let Reg(i) denote the expected
total regret over the lifetime of a worker on the event {X = i}, defined as
Reg(i) = N max
j∈J
[A(i, j)− p∗j ]−N
∑
j∈J
xpi∗(i, j)[A(i, j)− p∗j )].
Here Nxpi∗(i, j) is the expected total number of times a job of type j is allotted to a worker of
type i under the policy pi∗(N). We will refer to the above quantity as just regret. For the rest of
the proof, all the expectations are on the event {X = i}. The proof will utilize the fact that the
log of the ratio of the posteriors, log(λk(i)/λk(i′)), for any i and i′ is a random walk. That is,
if α(k) is the probability distribution over job types chosen at opportunity k, jk is the random
job chosen, and rk is the random reward obtained, then
log(
λk+1(i)
λk+1(i′)
)− log( λk(i)
λk(i′)
) = log
A(i, jk)1{rk=1} + (1−A(i, jk))1{rk=0}
A(i′, jk)1{rk=1} + (1−A(i′, jk))1{rk=0}
, ∆k,
where the random variables
{
∆k
}
k
are independent random variables with a finite support (since
rk and jk take finite values), and with mean
∑
j α
(k)
j KL(i, i
′|j), which we will refer to as the
drift of the random walk at opportunity k. Note here that if
∑
j α
(k)
j KL(i, i
′|j) = 0 then since
KL(i, i′|j) ≥ 0, it must be that KL(i, i′|j) = 0 for all j such that αkj > 0, and in this case we
must have A(i, j) = A(i, j′) for all such j. Thus ∆k = 0, i.e., the if the drift of the random walk
is 0 at some k then the random walk has stopped. Additionally, recall that ∆0 = log(ρi/ρi′).
Our goal is to compute an upper bound on Reg(i). To do so we first compute the expected
regret incurred till the end of the exploration phase in our algorithm. Denote this by Regxplr(i).
Below, we will find an upper bound on this regret assuming that the worker performs an un-
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bounded number of jobs. Clearly, the same bound holds on the expected regret until the end of
exploration phase if the worker leaves after N jobs.
Our strategy is as follows: we will decompose the regret till the end of exploration into the
regret incurred till the first time one of the following two events occurs:
1. Event Good: mini′ 6=i log(λk(i)/λk(i′)) ≥ log logN
2. Event Bad: mini′ 6=i log(λk(i)/λk(i′)) ≤ − log logN
followed by the residual regret, which will depend on which event occurred first (one of these
two events will occur with probability 1). The event Good occurs when the algorithm exits the
guessing mode by correctly identifying i as a guess, and the event Bad occurs when for some
i′ 6= i, the log posterior odd log(λk(i)/λk(i′)) crosses the lower threshold of − log logN .
We will compute two different upper bounds, depending on two different regimes of initial
prior distributions of the different types. Define the following two sets:
L1 ,
{
ρ′ ∈ ∆(I) :− log logN ≤ min
i′ 6=i
log(ρ′i/ρ
′
i′) ≤ log logN and (46)
min
i′ 6=i
log(ρ′i/ρ
′
i′) ≥ min
i′ 6=i
log(ρi/ρi′)
}
and (47)
L2 ,
{
ρ′ ∈ ∆(I) :− log logN ≤ min
i′ 6=i
log(ρ′i/ρ
′
i′) ≤ log logN and (48)
min
i′ 6=i
log(ρ′i/ρ
′
i′) < min
i′ 6=i
log(ρi/ρi′)
}
. (49)
Let Reg(1)(i) (Reg(2)(i)) be the highest expected regret incurred over all possible priors in L1
(L2). Then clearly, Regxplr(i) ≤ Reg(1)(i).
Let G(i) denote the maximum expected regret incurred by the algorithm till one of Good
or Bad occurs, where the maximum is taken over all possible starting priors in L1 ∪ L2. For
convenience, we denote Good < Bad as the event that Good occurs before Bad and vice versa
(we use the same notation to signify the precedence order of any two events). Thus we have for
s ∈ {1, 2},
Reg(s)(i) ≤ G(i) + sup
ρ′∈Ls
P(Good < Bad | ρ′)E(Residual regret | Good, ρ′)
+ sup
ρ′∈Ls
P(Bad < Good | ρ′)E(Residual regret | Bad, ρ′).
G(i) is upper-bounded as follows.
G(i) ≤ E(inf{k > 0 : min
i 6=i′
log(λk(i)/λk(i
′)) ≥ 2 log logN}}) = O(log logN).
This inequality follows from Lemma A.3, since if neither condition for event Good, nor for
event Bad is satisfied, then the policy in the guessing phase, and thus all job types are utilized
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with positive probability. Hence the condition in the Lemma of the requirement of a positive
learning rate for each distinction is satisfied. Also, from the second statement in Lemma A.3,
since the posteriors in L1 are such that mini′ 6=i log(ρ′i/ρ′i′) ≥ mini′ 6=i log(ρi/ρi′), we have that
P(Bad < Good | ρ′) ≤ P(Bad ever occurs) ≤ O(1)/ logN . Finally we have supρ′∈L2 P(Bad <
Good | ρ′) ≤ w for some w ∈ [0, 1). This follows from the fact that the probability that a
random walk with a positive drift ever returns to its starting point is strictly less than 1. We
thus have
Reg(1)(i) ≤ O(log logN) + sup
ρ′∈L1
E(Residual regret | Good, ρ′)
+
O(1)
logN
sup
ρ′∈L1
E(Residual regret | Bad, ρ′). (50)
Reg(2)(i) ≤ O(log logN) + sup
ρ′∈L2
E(Residual regret | Good, ρ′)
+ w sup
ρ′∈L2
E(Residual regret | Bad, ρ′). (51)
We next find upper bounds on supρ′∈Ls E(Residual regret | Good, ρ′) and supρ′∈Ls E(Residual regret |
Bad, ρ′) for s = 1, 2. First, consider supρ′∈Ls E(Residual regret | Good, ρ′). Now the residual
regret after event Good has occured depends on which of the following two events happens next:
1. Event Revert: mini′ 6=i log(λk(i)/λk(i′)) < log logN
2. Event Confirm: i gets confirmed, i.e., mini′∈Str(i) log(λk(i)/λk(i′)) > logN
Again conditional on event Good, one of the two events will occur with probability 1. We have
sup
ρ′∈Ls
E(Residual regret | Good, ρ′)
= sup
ρ′∈Ls
[
E(Residual regret | Good,Revert < Confirm, ρ′)P(Revert < Confirm | Good, ρ′)
+ E(Residual regret | Good,Confirm < Revert, ρ′)P(Confirm < Revert | Good, ρ′)
]
.
Now from Lemma A.4 it follows that
E(Residual regret | Good,Revert < Confirm, ρ′)P(Revert < Confirm | Good, ρ′)
= E(Residual regret I{Revert<Confirm} | Good, ρ′)
≤M + Reg(1)(i)P(Revert < Confirm | Good, ρ′)
for some constant M > 0 that does not depend on ρ′ or N . To see this, note that Revert <
Confirm is the event that, starting from some values between log logN and logN , the random
walk log(λk(i)/λk(i′)) for some i′ 6= i crosses the lower threshold log logN before the random
walks log(λk(i)/λk(i′′)) for all i′′ ∈ Str(i) cross the upper threshold logN . Now when all the ran-
dom walks (corresponding to all i′′ ∈ I) are between these two thresholds, the job distribution
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αk equals α(i) for all k. In particular, the drift for the random walks corresponding to i′′ ∈ Str(i)
is strictly positive. Further, as we argued earlier, if the drift for any of the other random walks
is 0, then that random walk has stopped, and such random walks can be ignored. Thus the con-
ditions of Lemma A.4 are satisfied, and hence E((Time till Revert) I{Revert<Confirm}|Good, ρ′) ≤
E((Time till Revert) I{Revert happens}|Good, ρ′) ≤ G < ∞. Since the regret per unit time is
bounded, the deduction follows.
Next, we have
E(Residual regret | Good,Confirm < Revert, ρ′)
≤ E(inf{k > 0 : min
i′∈Str(i)
λk(i)/λk(i
′) ≥ N})
∑
j∈J
αj
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
)
.
Thus we have
sup
ρ′∈Ls
E(Residual regret | Good, ρ′) (52)
≤ O(1) + sup
ρ′∈Ls
[
P(Revert < Confirm | Good, ρ′)Reg(1)(i) (53)
+ (1− P(Revert < Confirm | Good, ρ′))× (54)
E(inf{k > 0 : min
i′∈Str(i)
λk(i)/λk(i
′) ≥ N})[∑
j∈J
αj
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
)]]
. (55)
Hence, finally we have
sup
ρ′∈Ls
E(Residual regret | Good, ρ′) ≤ O(1) + wsReg(1)(i) (56)
+ (1− ws)E(inf{k > 0 : min
i′∈Str(i)
λk(i)/λk(i
′) ≥ N})[∑
j∈J
αj
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
)]
, (57)
for some ws ∈ (0, 1) for s = 1, 2, since supρ′∈Ls P(Revert < Confirm | Good, ρ′) < 1 and
infρ′∈Ls P(Revert < Confirm | Good, ρ′) > 0.
Next, consider supρ′∈Ls E(Residual regret | Bad, ρ′). Now the residual regret after event Bad
has occured depends on which of the following two events happens next:
1. Event Revert: mini′ 6=i log(λk(i)/λk(i′)) < log logN or
2. Event Bad-confirm: Some i′ 6= i gets confirmed, i.e., mini′′∈Str(i′) log(λk(i′)/λk(i′′)) >
logN
Again, conditional on Bad, one of the two events will occur with probability 1. Let K(i) be the
maximum expected regret incurred till either Revert or Bad-confirm occurs given that Bad has
occurred and the starting likelihoods were in Ls. Note that if Bad-confirm < Revert then the
exploration phase ends and hence there is no residual regret (Although note that if i′ is such
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that i ∈ Str(i′), then P(Bad-confirm < Revert | Bad, ρ′) ≤ O(1)/N from the second statement
in Lemma A.3.). Then we have
sup
ρ′∈Ls
E(Residual regret | Bad, ρ′) ≤ K(i) + sup
ρ′∈Ls
P(Revert < Bad-confirm | Bad, ρ′)Reg(2)(i).
We first show that if there is a type i′ such that i ∈ I\Str(i′), thenK(i) ≤ O(logN), where as
if there is no such type, then K(i) = O(1). Let T (i) be the maximum expected time until either
Revert or Bad-confirm occurs given that Bad has occurred and the starting likelihoods were in
Ls. Clearly K(i) ≤ T (i) since the price adjusted payoffs lie in [0, 1]. Now, let T1 be the time
spent after Bad has occurred, before Revert or Bad-confirm occurs, while either a) algorithm is
in the guessing phase or b) the algorithm is in the confirmation phase for some guessed type i′
such that α(i′)j > 0 for some j such that KL(i, i′|j) > 0. Under this case, we will say that the
algorithm is in state 1, and let 1k be the event that the algorithm is in state 1 at time k. Next
let T2 be the time spent after Bad has occurred, before Revert or Bad-confirm occurs, while
the algorithm is in the confirmation phase for some guessed type i′ such that α(i′)j = 0 for all
j such that KL(i, i′|j) > 0 (clearly this can happen only for i′ such that i ∈ I \ Str(i′); thus
if such an i′ doesn’t exist, then T2 = 0). Under this case, we will say that the algorithm is in
state 2, and let 2k be the event that the algorithm is in state 2 at time k. Now we clearly have
T (i) ≤ supρ′∈Ls E(T1 | Bad, ρ′) + supρ′∈Ls E(T2 | Bad, ρ′).
Let Γk(i) , mini′ 6=i log(λk(i)/λk(i′)). Then observe that E[(Γk+1(i)−Γk(i))I1k | Bad, ρ′] > ψ
for some ψ > 0 that depends only on the primitives of the problem and E[(Γk+1(i)−Γk(i))I2k |
Bad, ρ′] = 0, i.e, when the algorithm is in state 1, the drift of Γk(i) is strictly positive where as
when the algorithm is in state 2, then Γk(i) does not change.
Now consider E(T1 | Bad, ρ′). Let k∗ be the opportunity that Bad occurred for the first
time. Then clearly Γk∗(i) = − log logN − ε, where ε ≥ 0 is such that ε < M ′, where M ′ is
a constant depending only on the problem instance. Thus P(T1 > t | Bad, ρ′) ≤ P(Γk′(i) −
Γk∗(i) ≤ ε | Bad, ρ′) for some k′ > k∗ such that the algorithm has been in state 1 exactly
t times at opportunity k′. Thus our observation above, in particular that ψ > 0, implies by
a standard concentration bound that P(T1 > t | Bad, ρ′) ≤ exp(−ct) for some c > 0. Thus
E(T1 | Bad, ρ′) = O(1).
Next consider E(T2 | Bad, ρ′). Consider the successive returns of the algorithm to state 2.
Conditional on the algorithm having entered state 2, the expected time spent in that state is
bounded by the expected time till the guessed type i′ is confirmed, which is O(logN) from
Lemma A.3, and the conditional probability that i′ gets confirmed is some q > 0. Thus the total
expected number of returns to state 2 is bounded by 1/q. Thus E(T2 | Bad, ρ′) = O(logN) as
well. Thus K(i) ≤ O(logN) and we have
sup
ρ′∈Ls
E(Residual regret | Bad, ρ′) ≤ O(logN) + Reg(2)(i).
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And thus we finally have
Reg(1)(i) ≤ O(log logN) + w1Reg(1)(i) + 1
logN
(
O(logN + Reg(2)(i)
)
+ (1− w1)E(inf{k > 0 : min
i′∈Str(i)
λk(i)/λk(i
′) ≥ N})[∑
j∈J
αj
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
)]
;
(58)
Reg(2)(i) ≤ O(log logN) + w2Reg(1)(i) + wO(logN) + wReg(2)(i)
+ (1− w2)E(inf{k > 0 : min
i′∈Str(i)
λk(i)/λk(i
′) ≥ N})[∑
j∈J
αj
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
)]
.
(59)
Combining the above two equations, we deduce that
Regxplr(i) ≤ Reg(1)(i) ≤
1− q1
1− q1 − q2/ logN
(
O(log logN)
+ E[inf{k > 0 : min
i′∈Str(i)
λk(i)/λk(i
′) ≥ N}]
∑
j∈J
αj
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
))
= O(log logN)
+ (1 + o(1))E[inf{k > 0 : min
i′∈Str(i)
λk(i)/λk(i
′) ≥ N}]
∑
j∈J
αj
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
)
.
(60)
Now, we observed earlier that P(i′ gets confirmed | X = i) ≤ O(1)/N if i′ ∈ Str(i). Thus the
regret in the exploitation phase is in the worst case of order O(N) with probability 1/N and 0
otherwise. Thus the total expected regret in the exploitation phase is O(1). Thus
Reg(i) ≤ O(log logN)+(1+o(1))E[inf{k > 0 : min
i′∈Str(i)
λk(i)/λk(i
′) ≥ N}]
∑
j∈J
αj
(
U(i)−[A(i, j)−p∗j ]
)
.
Thus Lemma A.3 implies the result. (Note that if there are no difficult type pairs, then∑
j∈J αj
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ] = 0.)
Next, we prove Proposition 4.1, which says that for a large enough N , one can choose a
routing matrix y∗ in the exploitation phase of DEEM that satisfies (22)-(26).
We remark that the y∗ we construct satisfies ‖y∗ − x∗‖ = o(1). In order to prove this
proposition, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma A.5. Suppose that the generalized imbalance condition is satisfied. Consider any feasible
routing matrix [x(i, j)]I×J . Consider any job j such that
∑
i∈I ρix(i, j) = µj. Then there is a
path on the complete bipartite graph between worker types I and job types J with the following
properties:
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• One end point is job j.
• The other end point is a job type whose capacity is under-utilized (it is permitted to be κ).
• For every job type on the path in between, they are operating at capacity/all jobs are being
served. (All worker types are fully utilized by definition, since we formally consider an
unassigned worker as being assigned to job type κ.)
• For every undirected edge on the path, there is a positive rate of jobs routed on that edge
in x.
Proof. Consider a bi-partite graph with jobs representing nodes on one side and workers on the
other. There is an edge between a job j′ and a worker i if x(i, j) > 0. Consider the connected
component of job type j in this graph. Suppose it includes no job type that is underutilized.
Then the arrival rate of jobs from the set of workers in the connected component exactly matches
the total effective service rate of the sellers in connected component. But this is a contradiction
since generalized imbalance holds. Hence there exists an underutilized job type j′ that can be
reached from j. Take any path from j to j′. Traverse it starting from j and terminate it the
first time it hits any underutilized job type.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The defining condition (23) for m(i, j) can be written as
m(i, j) = ρ(i)y(i, j) + (l(i, i)− ρi)y(i, j) +mxplr(i, j) +
∑
i′ 6=i
l(i, i′)y(i′, j) ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J . (61)
A key fact that we will use is that all terms except the first one are o(1). (This holds because
the Explore phase of DEEM lasts only O(logN) periods in expectation, and because a fraction
o(1) of workers receive the wrong type label at the end of exploration.) In particular, m(i, j) =
ρ(i)y(i, j) + o(1).
We will find a y such that (22) and (24) hold and ‖y− x∗‖ = o(1). Note that this will imply
(25), since∑
i
m(i, j) =
∑
i
ρ(i)y(i, j) + o(1) =
∑
i
ρ(i)x∗(i, j) + o(1) < µj ∀j ∈ J \J ∗full ,
for N large enough.
The requirement (24) can be written as a set of |J ∗full| linear equations using (61). Instead of
working with y, we work with a “re-scaled” version y˜ , ρT y = [ρiy(i, j)]i,j , where y˜ must have
non-negative entries with the i-th row summing to ρi. Similarly, let x˜∗ , ρTx∗. In the rest of
this proof, we write y˜ (and later also x˜∗) as a column vector with |I||J | elements:
By˜ + εˆ = (µj)j∈J ∗full .
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Here we have ‖εˆ‖ = o(1) and matrix B can be written as B = B0 +Bε, where
B0(j, (i, j
′)) =
{
1 if j′ = j
0 otherwise.
and ‖Bε‖ = o(1). Expressing y˜ as y˜ = x˜∗ + z, we are left with the following requirement for z,
Bz = −(Bεx˜∗ + εˆ) (62)
using the fact that B0x∗ = (µj)j∈J ∗full by definitions of B0 and J ∗full. We will look for a solution
to this underdetermined set of equations with a specific structure: we want z to be a linear
combination of flows along |J ∗full| paths coming from Lemma A.5, one path λj for each j ∈ J ∗full.
Each λj can be written as a column vector with +1’s on the odd edges (including the edge
incident on j) and −1’s on the even edges. Let Λ = [λj ]j∈J ∗full be the path matrix. Then z with
the desired structure can be expressed as Λη, where η is the vector of flows along each of the
paths. Now note that Bz = (B0 + Bε)Λη = (I + BεΛ)η. Here we deduced B0Λ = I from the
fact that λj is a path which has j as one end point, and a worker or else a job not in J ∗full as the
other end point. Our system of equations reduces to
(I +BεΛ)η = −(Bεx˜∗ + εˆ) ,
Since ‖Bε‖ = o(1), the coefficient matrix is extremely well behaved, being only o(1) different
from the identity, and we deduce that this system of equations has a unique solution η∗ that
satisfies ‖η∗‖ = o(1). This gives us z∗ = Λη∗ that is also of size o(1), and supported on
permissible edges as per (22) since each of the paths is supported on permissible edges (Lemma
A.5). Thus, we finally obtain y˜∗ = x˜∗ + z∗, and corresponding y∗, possessing all the desired
properties. Notice that the (permissible) edges on which y∗ differs from x∗ had strictly positive
values in x∗ by Lemma A.5, and hence this is also the case in y∗ for large enough N .
Finally, we show that DEEM asymptotically achieves the required upper bound on regret.
Proposition A.6. Suppose that the generalized imbalance condition is satisfied. LetWN (DEEM)
be the value attained by DEEMN in optimization problem (12)-(14). Then
lim sup
N→∞
N
logN
(
V ∗ −WN (DEEM)) ≤ C.
Further, suppose that there are no difficult type pairs. Then,
lim sup
N→∞
N
log logN
(
V ∗ −WN (DEEM)) ≤ K
where K = K(ρ, µ,A) ∈ (0,∞) is some constant.
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Proof. From Proposition 4.1 along with (24) and (25), it follows that the policy DEEMN is
feasible in problem (12)-(14), and further
WNp∗ (DEEM) =
∑
i∈I
ρi
∑
j∈J
xDEEMN (i, j)A(i, j)−
∑
j∈J
p∗j
[∑
i∈I
ρixDEEMN (i, j)− µj
]
=
∑
i∈I
ρi
∑
j∈J
xDEEMN (i, j)A(i, j),
where the second equality follows from the fact that if p∗j > 0, then
∑
i∈I ρix
∗(i, j)− µj = 0 by
complementary slackness, and hence from (24) we obtain that
∑
i∈I ρixDEEMN (i, j)− µj = 0 as
well for these j. Thus the rate of accumulation of payoff under DEEM in problem (12)-(14) is
exactly WNp∗ (DEEM). Moreover, y∗(i, ·) ∈ ∆(J (i)) for all i ∈ I by (22) and optimality of x∗ for
the problem with known types. The result then follows from Proposition A.2.
B Computation of the policy in the confirmation subphase
In this appendix, we show how to compute α(i) as defined in Figure 2.
Denoting mini′∈Str(i)
∑
j∈J αjKL(i, i
′|j) as h (where h is non-negative), the optimization
problem in (20) is the same as:
min
∑
j∈J
αj
h
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
)
s.t.
∑
j∈J
αj
h
KL(i, i′|j) ≥ 1 for all i′ ∈ Str(i),
∑
j∈J
αj
h
=
1
h
,
1
h
≥ 0 and αj
h
≥ 0 for all j.
Now redefine αjh , α¯j and
1
h , h¯ to obtain the linear program:
min
∑
j∈J
α¯j
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
)
s.t.
∑
j∈J
α¯jKL(i, i′|j) ≥ 1 for all i′ ∈ Str(i),
α¯j ≥ 0 for all j,
where at any optimal solution α¯∗, we have h¯∗ =
∑
j∈J α¯
∗
j , and thus α(i)j = α¯
∗
j/
∑
j∈J α¯
∗
j . Note
that a feasible solution exists to this linear program as long as KL(i, i′|j) > 0 for some j for
each i′. When there are multiple solutions, we choose the solution with the largest learning rate;
i.e., we choose a solution with the smallest h¯∗, i.e.,
∑
j∈J α¯
∗
j . One way to accomplish this is
to modify the objective to minimize
∑
j∈J α¯j
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ] + τ
∑
j∈J α¯j for some small
τ > 0.
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For small problems, we can simply evaluate all the finite extreme points of the constrained
set {α¯ : ∑j∈J α¯jKL(i, i′|j) ≥ 1 for all i′ ∈ Str(i); α¯j ≥ 0 for all j}; i.e., all the extreme points
such that α¯j < ∞ for all j. This is sufficient because we can show that there always exists a
finite solution to the linear program. To see this, note that
α¯j = α¯
m
j ,
∑
i′∈Str(i)
1
KL(i, i′|j)I{KL(i,i′|j)>0}
is feasible and finite. Further, for any solution such that α∗j > α¯
m
j , α
∗
j can be reduced to α¯
m
j
without loss in objective while maintaining feasibility.
For the practical heuristic DEEM+ , αconf(MAP, λ) can be similarly computed as a solution
to a linear program as follows: Defining
1/h , max
i′∈Str(MAP)
logN + logR(MAP, i′)∑
j∈J αjKL(MAP, i′|j)
,
αconfirm(λ,MAP) is a solution to the optimization problem
min
∑
i
λ(i)
∑
j∈J
αj
h
(
U(i)− [A(i, j)− p∗j ]
)
s.t.
∑
j∈J
αj
h
KL(MAP, i′|j) ≥ logN + logR(MAP, i′) for all i′ ∈ Str(MAP),
∑
j∈J
αj
h
=
1
h
,
1
h
≥ 0 and αj
h
≥ 0 for all j.
We can again define α¯j , αj/h and h¯ , 1/h to obtain a linear program. For any optimal solution
α¯∗, return α = (α¯∗j/
∑
j′∈J α¯
∗
j )j∈J . If there are multiple solutions, then we can enumerate all
the finite extreme points that are solutions and pick the solution with the smallest h¯∗.
C Other proofs
C.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We prove the result by establishing the following fact, using induction: At
all times t, and for all i ∈ I,
νt(H, i) =
{
νpi(H, i) if length(H) ≤ min(t,N − 1) ,
0 otherwise .
(63)
The claim clearly holds at t = 0. The new arrivals ensure ν0(φ, i) = ρˆi = νpi(φ, i), and since the
system started empty, ν0(H, i) = 0 for all H 6= φ, i ∈ I.
Assume the inductive hypothesis at time t. The inductive hypothesis, together with the
52
definition of xpi and the capacity constraint (10) imply that∑
i∈I
∑
H
νt(H, i)pi(H, j) ≤
∑
i∈I
∑
H
νpi(H, i)pi(H, j) ≤ µj , ∀j ∈ J .
Not only does this establish (11) for time t, but it also ensures that sufficient capacity exists
to ensure that all workers at time t can be matched to their intended job type based on their
respective histories, according to policy pi. As a result, we have prior to t+ 1 that for all H such
that length(H) ≤ min(t,N − 2), and all j ∈ J , i ∈ I that
νt+1((H, (j, 1)), i) = νt(H, i)pi(H, j)A(i, j)
= νpi(H, i)pi(H, j)A(i, j)
= νpi((H, (j, 1)), i).
A similar argument applies to show that νt+1((H, (j, 0)), i) = νpi((H, (j, 0)), i). In other words,
we have shown that νt+1(H ′, i) = νpi(H ′, i) for all i ∈ I and H ′ such that 1 ≤ length(H ′) ≤
min(t+ 1, N − 1). Further, new arrivals at time t+ 1 ensure that νt+1(φ, i) = ρˆi = νpi(φ, i). It
remains to show that νt+1(H ′, i) = 0 for all H ′ such that length(H ′) > min(t+1, N−1). But this
is immediate since, by our inductive hypothesis, νt(H, i) = 0 for all H such that length(H) > t,
and workers leave after N periods. Induction completes the proof of (63) for all t ≥ 0.
Finally, note that the last sentence of the lemma saying that the system is in steady state for
all t ≥ N − 1 follows immediately from (63).
C.2 Sufficiency of worker-history-only policies
We show that there is a worker-history-only (WHO) policy that achieves a rate of payoff accu-
mulation that is arbitrarily close to the maximum possible. We will think of N as being fixed
throughout this section.
Suppose the system starts at time t = 1 with no workers already present before the period.19
Arrivals thereafter occur as described in Section 3. Consider any (arbitrary, time varying)
policy pi and let xpi,t(i, j) denote the derived quantity representing the fraction of workers of
type i who are assigned jobs on type j in period t under pi. Then the largest possible rate of
payoff accumulation under policy pi over long horizons is
V (pi) = limsupT→∞VT (pi) (64)
where VT (pi) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈I
ρi
∑
j∈J
xpi,t(i, j)A(i, j) . (65)
Note that we have ignored the effect of less than ρi workers of type i being present for the first
19The analysis would be very similar and produce the same results if the starting state is an arbitrary one with
a bounded mass of workers already present.
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N periods, but this does not change the limiting value V . Also, note that randomization in pi
cannot increase the achievable value of V , since one can always do as well by picking the most
favorable sample path.
Claim C.1. Fix any policy pi and any ε > 0. Then there is a worker-history-only (WHO) policy
that achieves a steady state rate of payoff accumulation exceeding V (pi)− ε.
Proof. We suppress dependence on pi. By definition of V , we know that there exists an increasing
sequence of times T1, T2, . . . such that VTi > V − ε/2 for all i = 1, 2, . . .. We will construct a
suitable WHO policy by using a sufficiently large time in this sequence. Let νt(Hk) be the
measure of workers in the system with history Hk just before the start of time t, and abusing
notation, let νt(Hk)j be the measure of such workers who are assigned to job type j at time t.
Since the policy cannot assign more jobs than have arrived in any period, we have
N∑
k=1
∑
Hk
νt(Hk)j ≤ µ(j) for all t ≥ 1 . (66)
Fix T , which we think of as a large member of the sequence above. The average measure of
workers with history Hk who are present is
ν¯(Hk) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
νt(Hk) for all Hk and k = 1, 2, . . . , N . (67)
The average measure of such workers who are assigned job j is similarly defined and denoted by
ν¯(Hk, j). We immediately have that
N∑
k=1
∑
Hk
ν¯(Hk)j ≤ µ(j) , (68)
by averaging Eq. (66) over times until T . Now, consider a worker with history Hk assigned a job
of type j. Using the known A matrix and arrival rates ρ, we can infer the posterior distribution
of the worker type based on Hk, and hence, the likelihood of the job of type j being successfully
completed. Let p(Hk, j) denote the probability of success. Then the distribution of Hk+1 for
the worker is simply given by
Hk+1 =
(
Hk,
(
j,Bernoulli(p(Hk, j))
) )
.
Barring the edge effect at time T caused by workers whose history was Hk at time T , this
allows us to uniquely determine ν¯(Hk+1) based on ν¯(Hk, j)’s. In particular, for any δ1 > 0, if
T ≥ maxi∈I ρi/(Nδ1) we have that
ν¯(Hk, (j, 1))
δ1≈ ν¯(Hk)jp(Hk, j)
ν¯(Hk, (j, 0))
δ1≈ ν¯(Hk)j
(
1− p(Hk, j)
)
. (69)
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Here, a
δ≈ b represents the bound |a− b| ≤ δ. Note that we have
VT =
N∑
k=1
∑
Hk
ν¯(Hk)jp(Hk, j) . (70)
We are now ready to define our WHO policy pi. For every Hk such that ν¯(Hk) ≥ δ2, this
policy will attempt to assign a fraction ν¯(Hk)j/ν¯(Hk) of workers with history Hk to jobs of type
j. Ignore capacity constraints for the present. (We will find that the capacity constraints will
be almost satisfied.) Leave the choice of δ2 for later; we will choose δ2 small and then choose
0 < δ1 < δ2/N so as to achieve the desired value of δ3 below. Workers with rare histories, i.e.,
histories such that ν¯(Hk) < δ2, will not be assigned jobs under pi. Note that the definition of
rare histories refers to frequency of occurrence under pi. Then, this uniquely specifies pi as well
as the steady state mix of workers before any time t. In particular, the steady state mass ν(Hk)
under pi of workers with history Hk that are not rare is bounded as
(1− δ1/δ2)k−1ν¯(Hk) ≤ ν(Hk) ≤ (1 + δ1/δ2)k−1ν¯(Hk)
(71)
using Eq. (69), and the fact that all subhistories of Hk are also not rare. It follows that
ν(Hk)
δ3≈ ν¯(Hk) where δ3 = max(exp(Nδ1/δ2)− 1, δ2) , (72)
for all histories (including rare histories), using k ≤ N and ν(Hk) ≤ 1. Violation of the j-capacity
constraint under pi is given by N∑
k=1
∑
Hk
ν(Hk)j − µ(j)

+
≤
 N∑
k=1
∑
Hk
ν¯(Hk)j − µ(j)

+
+ 2N |J |N−1δ3 = 2N |J |N−1δ3
using Eq. (72) and Eq. (68), and the fact that there are
∑
k≤N (2|J |)N−1 ≤ 2N |J |N−1 possible
histories. It follows that the sum of capacity constraint violations across j ∈ J is bounded by
(2|J |)Nδ3. Pick an arbitrary set of workers to go unmatched to get rid of any capacity violations
(this can be done while remaining within the class of WHO policies). In worst case, this will
cause payoff loss of 1 for each period remaining in the worker’s lifetime. Thus, the loss caused
by the need to remedy capacity violations is bounded by δ4 = N(2|J |)Nδ3 per period.
Ignoring capacity violations, the steady state rate of accumulation of payoff under pi is
N∑
k=1
∑
Hk
ν(Hk)jp(Hk, j)
δ5≈
N∑
k=1
∑
Hk
ν¯(Hk)jp(Hk, j) = VT (pi)
where δ5 = 2N |J |N−1δ3 < δ4 . (73)
again using Eq. (72) and the fact that there are
∑
k≤N (2|J |)N−1 ≤ 2N |J |N−1 possible histories.
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Let V (pi) denote the true steady state rate of accumulation of payoff under pi when capacity
constraints are considered. Combining the above, we deduce that V (pi) ≥ VT (pi)−2δ4. The time
T will be chosen as a member of the sequence defined at the beginning of the proof, ensuring
VT (pi) ≥ V (pi)− ε/2; hence it will suffice to show V (pi) ≥ VT (pi)− ε/2. Hence, it suffices to have
δ4 = ε/4, which can achieved using δ3 = δ2 = ε/(4N(2|J |)N ) and δ1 = δ3 log(1 + δ3)/N and T
a member of the sequence satisfying T ≥ maxi∈I ρi/(Nδ1). This yields the required bound of
V (pi) ≥ V (pi)− ε.
C.3 Uniqueness of prices under generalized imbalance
Proposition C.2. Under the generalized imbalance condition, the job shadow prices p∗ are
uniquely determined.
Proof of Proposition C.2. The dual to problem 16 can be written as
minimize
∑
j∈J
µjp(j) +
∑
i∈I
ρiv(i)
subject to
p(j) + v(i) ≥ A(i, j) ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J ,
p(j) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J ,
v(i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I .
The dual variables are (P, V ) where “job prices” P = (p(j))j∈J and “worker values” V =
(v(i))i∈I . We will prove the result by contradiction. Suppose there are multiple dual optima.
Let D be the set of dual optima. Let J ′ be the set of jobs such that the prices of those jobs
take multiple values in D. Formally,
J ′ = {j ∈ J : p(j) takes multiple values in D} . (74)
Similarly, let I ′ be the set of workers such that the prices of those workers take multiple values
in D. Formally,
I ′ = {i ∈ I : v(i) takes multiple values in D} . (75)
For each j ∈ J ′, we immediately deduce that there exists a dual optimum with p(j) > 0, and
hence the capacity constraint of job type j is tight in all primal optima. Similarly, we deduce
that for each i ∈ I ′, worker type i is assigned a job in all periods, i.e., ∑j∈J x(i, j) = 1. By
assumption, we have ∑
i∈I′
ρi 6=
∑
j∈J ′
µj .
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Suppose the left hand side is larger than the right (the complementary case can be dealt with
similarly). Take any primal optimum x∗. The jobs in J ′ do not have enough capacity to serve
all workers in I ′, hence there must be some worker i ∈ I ′ and a job s /∈ J ′ such that x∗(i, s) > 0.
Since s /∈ J ′, we must have that p(j) has a unique optimum value in D. Call this value p∗j . Let
the largest and smallest values of v(i) in D be vmax(i) and vmin(i). By complementary slackness,
we know that
vmax(i) + p∗j = A(i, j) = v
min(i) + p∗j
⇒ vmax(i) = vmin(i) .
But since i ∈ I ′ we must have vmax(i) > vmin(i). Thus we have obtained a contradiction.
C.4 Other miscellaneous proofs
The proof of the next proposition shows that a very simple “learn then exploit" strategy achieves
a regret of O(logN/N). This follows from the fact that, under an identifiability condition, the
sequence of sets (XN ) converges to the set D in an appropriately defined distance.
Proposition C.3. Suppose that no two rows in A are identical. Then supx∈D infy∈XN ‖x−y‖ =
O
(
logN
N
)
.
Proof. It is clear that XN ⊆ D. We will find an inner approximation X˜N to XN such that
X˜N ⊆ XN , and X˜N converges to D in an appropriate sense as N goes to infinity. To define this
approximation, suppose that in the learning problem corresponding to a fixed N , one starts off
with a exploration phase of a fixed length O(logN), where each job j is presented to the worker
Os number of times (where Os = O(logN), fixed a priori), so that after this phase, the type of
the worker becomes known with a probability of error at most O(1/N). This will then allow us
to relate the problem to the problem in which the user type is known.
Suppose after this phase, the probability that a worker of type i is correctly identified is p(i)
and the probability that she is mis-identified as some other type i′ is p(i, i′). Note that since
no two rows in A are identical, p(i, i′) = O(1/N) for all i 6= i′. Let d(i, j) denote the expected
number of times a worker that has been identified as being of type i (correctly or incorrectly)
is directed towards job j after the exploration phase, i.e., from job Os + 1 till the N th job. Let
d¯(i, j) = d(i, j)/N . Then we can see that, one can attain all x in the following set:
X˜N =
{
x ∈ R|I|×|J | : d¯(i, j) ≥ 0;
∑
j∈J
x(i, j) = 1; (76)
x(i, j) =
Os
N
+ p(i)d¯(i, j) +
∑
i′ 6=i
p(i, i′)d¯(i′, j)
}
(77)
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Now since d¯(i, j) ≤ 1, and since p(i, i′) ≤ O(1/N), we can express the above set as:
X˜N =
{
x ∈ R|I|×|J | : d¯(i, j) ≥ 0;
∑
j∈J
x(i, j) = 1; x(i, j) = d¯(i, j) + O
( logN
N
)}
(78)
This in turn is the same as:
X˜N =
{
x ∈ R|I|×|J | : x(i, j) ≥ O
( logN
N
)
;
∑
j∈J
x(i, j) = 1
}
(79)
Note that by construction, X˜N ⊆ xN . But we can now see that X˜N converges to D in the sense
that
sup
x∈D
inf
y∈X˜N
‖x− y‖ = O
( logN
N
)
,
and hence,
sup
x∈D
inf
y∈XN
‖x− y‖ = O
( logN
N
)
as well.
Proposition C.4. The set XN is a convex polytope.
Proof. For the purpose of this proof, let
XN = {Nx : x ∈ XN}.
We will show that XN is a polytope, from which the result will follow. We will prove this using
an induction argument. We will represent each point in XN as a |I|× |J | matrix (x(i, j))|I|×|J |.
Let worker types in I be labeled as i1, . . . , i|I| and let job types in J be labeled as j1, . . . , j|J |.
Now clearly, X 0 = {(0)|I|×|J |} which is a convex polytope. We will show that if XN is
a convex polytope, then X (N+1) is one as well, and hence the result will follow. To do so, we
decompose the assignment problem with (N+1) jobs, into the first job and the remainingN jobs.
A policy in the (N+1)- jobs problem is a choice of a randomization over the jobs in J for the
first job, and depending on whether a reward was obtained or not with the chosen job, a choice
of a point in XN to be achieved for the remaining N jobs. Each such policy gives a point in the
X (N+1). Suppose that η1 ∈ ∆(J ) is the randomization chosen for job 1, and let W (j, 1) ∈ XN
and W (j, 0) ∈ XN be the points chosen to be achieved from job 2 onwards depending on the job
j that was chosen, and whether a reward was obtained or not, i.e.. W (., .) is a mapping from
J × {0, 1} to the set XN . Then this policy achieves the following point in the (N + 1)- jobs
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problem:
η1(j1) η1(j2) . . . η1(j|J |)
...
...
. . .
...
η1(j1) η1(j2) . . . η1(j|J |)
+ ∑
j∈J
η1(j)
(
Diag[A(., j)]W (j, 1) + Diag[A¯(., j)]W (j, 0)
)
,
where
Diag[A(., j)] =

A(i1, j) 0 . . . 0
0 A(i2, j) . . . 0
...
...
. . . 0
0 0 . . . A(i|I|, j)

and
Diag[A¯(., j)] =

1−A(i1, j) 0 . . . 0
0 1−A(i2, j) . . . 0
...
...
. . . 0
0 0 . . . 1−A(i|I|, j)
 .
And thus we have
X (N+1) ={
η1(j1) η1(j2) . . . η1(j|J |)
...
...
. . .
...
η1(j1) η1(j2) . . . η1(j|J |)
+ ∑
j∈J
η1(j)
(
Diag[A(., j)]W (j, 1) + Diag[A¯(., j)]W (j, 0)
)
: η1 ∈ ∆(J ), W (., .) ∈ XN
}
.
Let 1s be the |I| × |J | matrix with ones along column corresponding to job type j and all
other entries 0. Then the set
J (s) =
{
1s + Diag[A(., j)]W (j, 1) + Diag[A¯(., j)]W (j, 0) : W (s, .) ∈ XN
}
,
is a convex polytope, being a linear combination of two convex polytopes, followed by an affine
shift. It is easy to see that X (N+1) is just a convex combination of the polytopes J (s) for j ∈ J ,
and hence X (N+1) is a convex polytope as well.
D Using PD-control to stabilize queue-lengths
In the implementation of DEEM+ we propose using PD-control on the prices with the goal of
stabilizing queue-lengths. These prices consist of two terms: the proportional term, and the
derivative term. The proportional term captures the idea that if the queue length is small then
this signifies that the job type is in high demand and hence the price for this type should be
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high. Thus, if the queue length of job type j at any epoch l is qj(l), the proportional component
of the price of j at any time between that epoch and the next is set to be
pPj (l) = (B − qj(l))/B (80)
where B is the buffer size of the queue. A purely proportional price control does not necessarily
stabilize queue-lengths; it may lead to oscillations of queue-sizes and hence of the prices, which
could be detrimental to performance.
In order to dampen possible oscillations we add a derivative term. Let qj(l) be the queue-
length of job type j at job arrival/assignment epoch l. For a fixed window sizeW , we keep track
of the moving-average queue-length qavgW (l), defined as
qavg, Wj (l) = (1− 1/W )qavg, Wj (l − 1) + 1/Wqj(l).
Informally, (qavg,W (l) − qj(l))/W is an estimate of the derivative of the mean queue-length
at epoch l (the window size should be small enough, but not too small, so that stochastic
fluctuations are averaged out). Then we define the derivative term of the prices to be
pDj (l) = −
ζ
B
(qavg, Wj (l)− qj(l)). (81)
Finally, the price for each job type j between epochs l and l + 1 is given by
pqj(l) = p
P
j (l) + p
D
j (l).
It remains to decide the values of W and ζ.
In our simulations, we use two derivative terms as per (81) corresponding to window sizes
W1 = 2400 and W2 = 2400/1.8 ≈ 1333. For both these terms, we choose a common value of
ζ = 5. All these parameters were chosen through trial-and-error to achieve a reasonable degree
of stability in the prices (c.f., Table 1) and they were held constant throughout our simulations.
E Practical implementation of other policies
The two policies PA-TS and TS-DEEM+ are defined in Figures 7 and 8.
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PA-TS
Input parameters: I, J , A, ρ, N , queue-based prices pq.
Pre-compute: The sets J q(i) defined in (42) for each worker type i ∈ I.
1: . Main Routine
2: procedure PA-TS . Acts independently on each worker, over her lifetime, from arrival to departure
3: λ(i)← ρi for all i ∈ I . The un-normalized posterior probabilities; initialized to the prior
4: k ← 0 . Number of time steps the worker has been in the system
5: while k < N do
6: Assign job type jk ∼ TS(λ) . At the next time step
7: Observe payoff rk
8: λ(i)← λ(i)× (A(i, jk)1{rk=1} + (1−A(i, jk))1{rk=0}), for all i ∈ I
9: k ← k + 1
10: end while
11: end procedure
12: . Functions
13: function TS(λ)
14: For each j ∈ J , define . Thompson sampling
αj =
(∑
i∈I
λ(i)
Ij∈J q(i)
|J q(i)|
)/∑
i∈I
λ(i)
15: return α = (αj)j∈J
16: end function
Figure 7: Definition of PA-TS. The prices pq depend on the queue-lengths of the different job
types, as discussed in Section 7.1, and formally defined in Appendix D.
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TS-DEEM+
Input parameters: I, J , A, ρ, N , queue-based prices pq.
Pre-compute:
• The sets J q(i) defined in (42) for each worker type i ∈ I.
• The set of worker types Strq(i) defined in Definition 2 for all i ∈ I.
• The maximal externality adjusted payoffs Uq(i) for all i ∈ I defined in (43) and the maximal per-step
mislabeling regrets R(i, i′) for all i, i′ ∈ I defined in (44)–(45).
1: . Main Routine
2: procedure TS-DEEM+ . Acts independently on each worker, over her lifetime, from arrival to departure
3: . Initialization:
4: λ(i)← ρi for all i ∈ I . The un-normalized posterior probabilities; initialized to the prior
5: MAP← arg maxi∈I λ(i) . Initialization of the MAP estimate
6: Label← ∅ . Worker label; initially unassigned, denoted by ∅
7: k ← 0 . Number of time steps the worker has been in the system
8: . Explore phase:
9: while Label = ∅ and k < N do
10: Assign job type jk ∼ Explore(λ) . At the next time step
11: Observe payoff rk
12: λ(i)← λ(i)× (A(i, jk)1{rk=1} + (1−A(i, jk))1{rk=0}), for all i ∈ I
13: MAP← arg maxi∈I λ(i)
14:
15: if mini∈Strq(MAP) λ(MAP)λ(i)R(MAP,i) ≥ N then . if confirmation is complete
16: Label← MAP . Worker label assigned. Will cause while loop to exit.
17: end if
18: k ← k + 1
19: end while
20: . Exploit phase:
21: while k < N do
22: Assign job type jk = Exploit(λ) . At the next time step
23: k ← k + 1
24: end while
25: end procedure
26: . Functions
27: function Explore(λ)
28: For each j ∈ J , define . Thompson sampling
αj =
(∑
i∈I
λ(i)
Ij∈J q(i)
|J q(i)|
)/∑
i∈I
λ(i)
29: return α = (αj)j∈J
30: end function
31: function Exploit(λ)
32: j∗ = arg maxj∈J
∑
i∈I λ(i)
[
A(i, j)− pqj
]
. Greedy
33: return j∗
34: end function
Figure 8: Definition of TS-DEEM+ . The prices pq depend on the queue-lengths of the different
job types, as discussed in Section 7.1, and formally defined in Appendix D.
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